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Abstract
Since the Treaty of the European Union in 1993, the EU has
embraced institutional reforms with the stated purpose of achieving
greater unity in foreign affairs. Despite the EU’s leading role in the
political and economic reforms of former Soviet satellites in Central
and Eastern Europe, the EU has been less consistent and cohesive in
former Soviet space further east—in regions fraught with undemocratic
qualities and places where the EU enjoys fewer credible incentives and
less leverage. While scholars point to divergent national interests as
obstacles for unity abroad, few have unraveled how the institutions of
the EU itself pose challenges as well. This research asks whether the
institutions of the EU—particularly the Commission, the Council, and
the Parliament—promote or hinder the EU’s ability to act as a global
unitary actor. It analyzes EU institutional democratic discourse in three
cases of color revolutions in former Soviet space from 2003 to 2011:
Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic. The research is based on a
qualitative database of official institutional documents from the
European Commission, the Council of the European Union, and the
European Parliament to identify patterns of discourse in the
construction of democracy. The study finds that, across the
vii

institutions, democratic discourse is only consistent in the minimal
requisites of democracy—particularly elections and rule of law—but the
institutions diverge substantially on whether these elements are
necessary and sufficient, versus necessary but insufficient. Even if
member-states find common ground at the national level, the
institutional dynamics of the EU continue to undermine its ability to
assert itself as a unitary actor in foreign affairs. The findings of this
study have implications for theories on international relations,
democracy, and states. It demonstrates that there are limits to
mainstream liberal institutionalist approaches best captured by
constructivism, and that the EU as a whole, the institutions of the EU,
and the constituent member-states can all become actors with
competing interests in a given issue area. The study concludes with
potential avenues of future research.

viii

Chapter 1: The European Union on the World Stage
1.1

Introduction
Since the founding Treaty of the European Union came into

effect in 1993, the European Union (EU) has gradually gained power as
an actor on the world stage. Its influence is evident in the post-Soviet
world where it negotiated the admission of ten former communist
states and possibly several more in the foreseeable future. Despite the
EU’s leading role in the political and economic reforms of these new
members, the EU’s ability to act cohesively in the international
community remains constrained and inconsistent. Yet the EU as a
whole makes a concerted effort to do so: Each treaty since 1993 takes
formal and legally binding steps toward a more coherent and
consolidated foreign policy framework.
While scholars have pointed to divergent national interests as
obstacles for unity and cohesion, few have unraveled how the
institutional complexity of the EU itself poses challenges as well. That
is, even if member-states find common ground at the national level,
the institutional dynamics of the EU continue to undermine its power
as a unitary actor abroad. The primary institutions of the EU fulfill very
1

different mandates and embody supranational, intergovernmental, and
representative elements. The European Commission acts on behalf of
EU interests, the Council of the EU acts on behalf of member-state
interests, and the European Parliament acts on behalf of voter
interests. These interests do not necessarily overlap and each one
rests on different sources and degrees of legitimacy.
This research therefore focuses on the impact of EU
institutions—particularly the Commission, the Council, and the
Parliament—on the EU as a unitary actor in foreign affairs. Despite the
EU’s ability to successfully negotiate the admission of various new
members undergoing transitions to democracy and free economy, the
EU is characterized by an internal hodgepodge of competing interests.
This institutional complexity challenges the notion of the EU as a
unitary global actor.
The EU as a unitary actor is perhaps most indispensable in
foreign affairs, where cohesiveness has been a goal of the EU for many
years. The EU continues to struggle for coherence in sensitive foreign
policy areas like security and immigration to little avail, but it has long
preserved a normative commitment to democracy since its inception,
even if in rhetoric only. Democratization issues are one of the few
foreign policy areas where the EU has appeared to be a unitary actor.
Over the course of five phases of integration that resulted in 27
2

members, the EU has played an important role in numerous
democratic transitions, namely those of Southern Europe in the 1980s,
and Central and Eastern Europe following the collapse of communism
in the region. Indeed, the most fundamental and non-negotiable
requirement for admission into the EU is democracy.
In societies with little to no firsthand experience with democracy,
much of the defining was led by the EU, but the EU has no official
definition of democracy; the standards are largely subjective. Likewise,
there is no consensus on the meaning of democracy among the
primary institutions of the EU, either. If there is a most-likely context
in which the EU ought to be a unitary actor in foreign affairs, it is in
democratization. This research therefore focuses on the sphere of
democratic discourse in foreign affairs, a sector which appears to have
some degree of cohesion regarding democratic rhetoric on the surface,
but which this study contends is undermined by competing institutional
interests (rather than solely national interests).
Of the regions across the globe, the EU espouses democratic
values in the regions formerly under Soviet influence especially. While
this may have been effective in Central Europe, the Baltics, and to
some degree even the Balkans, it is less compatible in EU relationships
further east, in regions fraught with undemocratic qualities and places
where the EU seems to hold much less leverage, such as Eastern
3

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. This research seeks to
uncover how the leading institutions of the EU diverge and converge in
their framing and formal discourses about non-member-states in
former Soviet space by analyzing the institutional documents of the
Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. Institutional documents
can reveal public discursive patterns used, without the cloak afforded
by private discourse.
In the sphere of democracy, these three regions—Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia—are united by a common
historical thread: the ‘color revolutions’, which were popular electoral
revolutions most associated with Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004 and
the Kyrgyz Republic in 2005. In these three countries, democratic
discourse was far more relevant than it had been ever before.
These regions are notably understudied in EU research as well,
particularly Central Asia, yet they are places that have grown
increasingly salient for the EU itself, especially in the post-9/11/2001
context. The limited research surrounding EU-Central Asian relations
was understandable considering the limited engagement between the
two regions throughout the 1990s (Yazdani 2008). After 9/11,
however, the region’s proximity to Afghanistan added geopolitical
salience for the West; the US, for instance, established military bases
in Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic (Melvin 2008, 3). The EU
4

renewed interest in the region as well, largely due to security, border,
and energy concerns (Melvin 2008, 4; Yazdani 2008). In addition to
Afghanistan, the region is geopolitically salient to major Western
powers such as the EU due to the significance of Central Asia’s other
neighbors, including Russia, China, and Iran (Yazdani 2008).
EU ties to the Caucasus have also grown post-9/11, because of
the region’s periodic political and security volatility. Georgia’s President
Mikhail Saakashvili has maintained a close relationship with the EU,
and he and his officials have openly declared EU membership as a
long-term policy objective. Following the 2004 and 2007 rounds of
enlargement, countries in Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine,
became geopolitically and strategically valuable as buffers between the
West and Russia. Increased EU interest in former Soviet space was
evident in the European Neighborhood Policy, a series of bilateral
agreements established in 2004, and the Eastern Partnership, a
multilateral framework centered on Eastern Europe, in 2009.
This research contributes to the fields of EU studies,
international relations, comparative politics, institutions, foreign policy,
and democracy. It primarily questions whether the inter-institutional
dynamics of the EU undermine its ability to be a unitary actor abroad.
Under consideration is an issue area within foreign affairs that should
be most conducive to cohesive discourse, i.e. democracy, as well as
5

cases most likely to elicit such discourse, i.e. former Soviet space.
Therefore, this research explores how the main institutions of the EU
converge and diverge in foreign affairs as they address issues of
democracy in non-member-states. The objective is to identify how the
institutional dynamics of the EU promote or hinder it as a unitary
global actor. The focus on foreign affairs and policy serves as a crucial
instance of the level of EU institutional and political integration. It is a
crucial test case, because it serves as an indicator of how far EU
integration has advanced. Though the unit of analysis is not foreign
policy but the institutions themselves, foreign policy is the crucial field
in which the institutions act or fail to act as a unitary actor.

1.2

A Brief History of the EU, 1951-2003
Today’s EU is the product of over half a century of cooperation in

Western Europe. The European Union began as the European Coal and
Steel Community, formally established by the Treaty of Paris of 1951,
in which war-torn France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg addressed common concerns by establishing a
supranational institution. The founding members sought the
reconstruction of postwar economies, the prevention of conflict based
on nationalism, and the need for security in a Cold War context
6

(McCormick 2005, 52). Coal and steel were the targeted industries due
to their critical role during war, but also as a way to contain Germany,
foster interdependence, and encourage industrial development (60).
Notably absent from the early negotiations of united Europe was
Britain, which did not join the Community until 1973. Britain’s
reluctance to join was based in part on concerns about preserving
influence in the international community vis-à-vis the United States,
the Commonwealth, and Western Europe (Kaiser 1996, 5-8, 129).
Until the successes of the then-renamed European Economic
Community became apparent following the Treaties of Rome (1957)
and until Britain’s economic power abroad began to decline, there was
little political and economic incentive for Britain to commit to the early
European negotiations (116, 126). Britain did apply for membership in
1961 and 1967 after all, only to be vetoed twice by France’s Charles
de Gaulle, who perceived close British-US ties as a threat to the
European (and French) vision of the Community (135). Britain
renegotiated entry after De Gaulle’s death, and joined the Community
in 1973.
The first round of enlargement took place that year, with the
accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. The next
round of enlargement took place in 1981 when Greece joined; Spain
and Portugal joined five years later. The 1970s and early 1980s were a
7

period of stagnation for European integration that came to be known
as ‘Eurosclerosis’. The pace of integration increased in the mid-1980s
with the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. The SEA changed
institutional voting methods, developed social policies, and targeted
regional inequalities within the EU (Dinan 2004, 209-227). Arguably
most importantly, the SEA established the single market among the
twelve member-states and laid the foundation for the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU), which would later become the basis for the
common currency (McCormick 2005, 69).
A few short years later, communism collapsed in Central and
Eastern Europe, and it became evident in the 1990s that many former
Soviet satellites would seek the West for security, growth, and
stability. The Maastricht Treaty (1993) was a response to this political
reality, and it introduced a set of criteria for membership, including
stable institutions that can guarantee democracy, the rule of law, and
human rights; a functioning market economy; and adherence to the
EU’s body of law. Amid the changing international environment,
another enlargement took place in 1995, bringing the membership
count to 15: Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The EU adopted and
implemented major treaties in 1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam,
and 2003 with the Treaty of Nice. These treaties had ramifications for
the institutions of the EU, which will be addressed in the next section.
8

1.3

The Institutions of the European Union
The binding treaties of the EU govern institutional powers.

Notable among them, the Treaty of Maastricht, also known as the
Treaty of the European Union or TEU (effective November 1993), is the
foundational framework for the current institutional arrangement of
the EU. It is also the treaty which gave the EU a formal supranational
role in foreign affairs for the first time by introducing the concept of a
common foreign and security policy, with the purpose of achieving a
unified voice amid a cacophony of member-state policies (TEU 1993).
Since then, the TEU has been amended on three occasions: Treaty of
Amsterdam (effective May 1999), Treaty of Nice (effective February
2003), and Treaty of Lisbon (effective December 2009). Each
amending treaty conferred greater foreign policy making power to the
EU, but the basic tenets and authority of the TEU still stand.
The Treaty of Amsterdam (‘Amsterdam’), which followed the
crisis in former Yugoslavia, sought to improve coherence and
effectiveness in foreign policy. In 1999, Amsterdam expanded and
formalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP, discussed
on the following page) and the position of High Representative of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy (now defunct) (Amsterdam
9

1999). The Treaty of Nice was signed in 2001, but went into effect in
2003; it modified EU institutions to accommodate the upcoming
enlargement. By 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon (‘Lisbon’) added further
changes by merging the High Representative position from Amsterdam
with the External Affairs Commissioner to create the post of High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
(Lisbon 2009). Lisbon also created the European External Action
Service (EEAS), which acts as an EU diplomatic mission abroad.
Based on the founding and amending treaties, the institutions of
the EU work together in foreign affairs. The European Council—which
is different from the Council of Ministers and is not an institution I
analyze in this research—convenes the heads of state to determine
general foreign policy direction and goals; these are very strategic
level determinations.
How the Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the
Parliament interact in foreign affairs depends on whether or not the
issue is considered part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP). The CFSP is limited to sensitive foreign policy areas and “high
politics”, such as military, defense, and security. Other issue areas
often associated with foreign policy, such as international agreements,
humanitarian aid, foreign assistance, and electoral oversight, are not
part of the CFSP.
10

The TEU established and delineated the basic institutional
process of the CFSP. Under the TEU, the presidency of the Council of
Ministers, in charge of the CFSP, keeps the European Parliament
informed, while the Parliament can ask questions, make
recommendations, and debate CFSP matters (TEU Articles 13, 18, 21).
The Council “ensure[s] the unity, consistency and effectiveness of
action by the Union” (Article 13).
Foreign policy areas that fall outside the CFSP domain become
part of the normal policy process of the EU; the Commission is the
foreign representative in such affairs and proposes legislation to the
Council, which must conclude and pass the legislation with the assent
of the Parliament. More specifically, the Council of Ministers (also
known as the Council or the Council of the EU, but should not be
confused with European Council and the Council of Europe) convenes
the foreign ministers of each member-state to define actionable
specifics of foreign policy. This policy is proposed by the Commission,
which negotiates international agreements on behalf of the EU. For
simplicity, we can consider the Commission to be the representative,
the Council to be the decision-maker, and the Parliament to be the
consultant.


The Commission, foreign representative of the EU: As the
most supranational institution of the EU, the Commission
11

plays a very important role in foreign affairs: it negotiates
agreements on behalf of the EU in the international stage.
Before Lisbon, the Commission’s most important role in
foreign policy was through the Directorate General for
External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy
(known as DG RELEX), which served as the EU
representative abroad (Popescu 2011, 28). This research
takes into account configurations before and after Lisbon,
because the Commission played the same essential role in
both as the EU representative abroad.


The Council, decision-maker of foreign affairs: Foreign policy
making resides here, in the most intergovernmental of EU
institutions. Until Lisbon in 2009, foreign affairs topics were
discussed in the “General Affairs and External Relations
Council” configuration of the Council, which convened the
Foreign Affairs ministers of each member-state. After Lisbon,
this configuration split into two entities: the General Affairs
Council (addressing issues that cut across policy areas) and
the Foreign Affairs Council (addressing issues explicitly
external), both of which convene the foreign ministers of
member-states. In either case, the national ministers meet
in these Council configurations to make policy. Several other
12

important roles fall under the Council, including that of the
Secretariat General of the Council (which is the staff), the EU
Special Representatives, the Political and Security
Committee (PSC) of the Council, and the PSC’s subcommittees (Popescu 2011, 27). This research considers the
Council in its pre- and post-Lisbon configurations, since they
all encompassed the same elements: the foreign affairs
ministries, liaison representatives, support staff, and
committees.


The Parliament, consultant on foreign matters: Although the
Parliament does not play a leading role in the foreign policy
process, it does play an institutionalized consultative one,
especially through its Committee on Foreign Affairs. For
matters outside the CFSP, the Parliament must consent to
issues ranging from the accession of new member-states to
international agreements with non-member-states. For CFSP
topics, the High Representative (which falls under the
Council) regularly informs and consults with the Parliament.
For instance, the High Representative submits a consultative
document on the main substantive and technical points of
foreign policy to the Parliament twice per year; the
Parliament can then pose questions or recommendations to
13

the Council and the High Representative. The Parliamentary
Committee on Foreign Affairs includes two subcommittees as
well: security and defense, and human rights. The latter
assists with a parliamentary yearly report on human rights
across the world, which the Parliament regularly includes in
its agenda.
As the bullets above and Figure 1 demonstrate, the three
institutions have different sources of legitimacy, types of membership
representing different constituencies, and divergent interests.

Commission
(The
Representative)

Council of
Ministers
(The DecisionMaker)

Parliament
(The Consultant)

•Supranational, represents interests of the EU
•EU's international representative; negotiates
international agreements (except for limited
CFSP, which resides with the Council)
•1 Commissioner per member appointed for 5 yrs
•Only institution that can propose legislation,
which then goes to the Council and Parliament
•Intergovernmental, represents state interests
•Decision-makers; for non-CFSP, makes EU
foreign policy based on proposals by the
Commission and in consultation with Parliament
•For CFSP matters, retains primary authority
•Each member-state sends its foreign minister to
meetings on foreign affairs
•Appoints the High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, who chairs the
Foreign Affairs Council and leads CFSP
•Subnational, represents interests of the citizens
•Must consent to legislation, approve Commission
appointments, and is the only body that can
dismiss the Commission
•Ministers popularly elected for 5 yrs

Figure 1: Institutions of the EU
14

While the consultative role of the Parliament in the foreign policy
process may not seem vital to the EU’s ability to project itself abroad,
this research contends that the Parliament is essential to this kind of
research. First, the parliament is one of the major EU institutions, and
as such requires attention. Second, the parliament is the only
democratic voice in all EU institutions, and thus it is an important
perspective to consider. Finally, the Parliament has gradually gained
power throughout the years, which suggests that (should the trend
continue) the Parliament will gain power in the foreign policy making
process. In fact, parliamentarians have already expressed frustration
at their seemingly relegated role in the process and may pressure for
greater influence in the future.
This research focuses on three institutions of the EU: the
Commission, the Council, and the Parliament. The institutional
structure of the EU confers uneven powers among them in foreign
affairs, which may lead scholars in the field to question the value of
observing their inter-institutional dynamics. This research contends
that this is precisely where scholars have failed to keep pace. The EU’s
evolving institutional powers suggest that these three institutions will
continue to be the primary elements in foreign affairs. Because no
single institution has or will have sole influence over EU foreign affairs,
15

it is critical to understand how the main players interact, and how they
affect far-reaching policies. Furthermore, despite the evolution of subinstitutional entities (such as specific liaisons or committees), the
major institutions themselves continue to represent a consistent set of
interests: supranational, national, and subnational. The failure to
observe inter-institutional dynamics and the assumption that the
primary obstacle to the EU as a unitary actor abroad stems only from
national-level divergences are important elements of EU studies that
merit further attention.

1.4

Purpose of Research
This research project uses a constructivist foundation, which will

be explained more fully in the next chapter, to explore the sphere of
EU foreign affairs, a sector which appears to have some degree of
cohesion regarding democratic rhetoric, but which this research
contends is undermined by competing institutional interests (rather
than solely national interests). This dissertation poses the following
questions: What are the roles, powers, and interests of the EU’s main
institutions in foreign policy, and how do they portray democracy in
the former Soviet non-member-states? To what extent do the
institutions of the EU converge or diverge in approaches to foreign
16

policy, and do the institutions of the EU promote or hinder the EU’s
ability to assert itself as a global unitary actor? Why does the EU
emphasize democratic discourse in some cases and not others, and
what are the patterns of democratic discourse across EU institutions?
And, finally, why do EU institutions vary in their approaches to foreign
policy?

1.5

Chapter Overview
The research is divided into 7 chapters. The next chapter is a

survey of the relevant literature in international relations theory,
integration theory, studies on the EU as an international actor, and
democracy to build a research agenda and theoretical foundation for
this analysis. Chapter three outlines the research design, including the
methodology, key concepts, and case and data selection. It will
demonstrate how qualitative data analysis software facilitates
qualitative content and primarily discourse analysis to identify relevant
discursive patterns. Chapter four provides context for the EU internally
and externally, and for the case studies. Chapter five is the empirical
chapter, which presents the democratic discourse of the institutions
based on the data compiled for this study. Chapter six analyzes the
discursive findings to identify how the EU constructed democracy
17

through discourse in the case studies. The concluding chapter
addresses the theoretical implications and relevance of the findings, as
well as potential avenues of future research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Foundations
2.1

Introduction
The European Union has generated a great deal of scholarly

discussion across a wide range of issue areas. This chapter provides an
overview of the theories that will be most useful for the questions and
findings of this research. The first section addresses mainstream
theories of international relations to identify the potential for and limits
of interstate cooperation through institutions. These theories include
variants of realism, liberalism, and constructivism as they relate to
institutions. The first section also includes academic perspectives on
the role of the state within the EU and the EU conceptualized as a
state. The second section explores regionalism and integration theory
to identify how and why the level of EU institutional integration has
changed over time. The two main theories in this section are
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. The third section delves
into foreign policy and the literature on conditionality, as a form of EU
foreign policy in former Soviet space, to consider EU use of incentives
and disincentives along the eastern periphery. The fourth section
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surveys the democracy literature, while the concluding section outlines
an agenda for the research presented ahead.
The primary element of focus across these theories and sections
is institutions, which are defined as rules that shape state cooperation
and competition, behavior and norms, and the organizations that help
manage the implementation of such rules (Mearsheimer 1994, 8). The
theories in this chapter will be helpful for understanding theoretical
debates on whether the notion of the EU as a unitary actor is possible
or even desirable. They also illustrate the extent to which states retain
or surrender power to growing institutions. Once the overarching
institution enjoys powers beyond its constituent member states, such
as conditionality, academic discourse describes the bounds of
institutional power in foreign affairs. Taken together, these theories
will set a solid foundation for exploring inter-institutional dynamics in
the EU.

2.2

International Relations Theory and Institutions

2.2.1 Neorealism and Institutions
The theoretical tenets and assumptions of realists—such as the
anarchic system, the security dilemma, and the primary role of the
state as a unitary actor—prove problematic in cases like the EU, which
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appeared to violate such basic premises. The EU was a seemingly
successful instance of states pooling sovereignty and overcoming
interstate competition and conflict through institutions.
Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar
system, John Mearsheimer argued that international institutions would
be unable to shape state behavior in ways conducive to peace. Like
many other realists, he argued that institutions hold “minimal
influence” over state behavior (Mearsheimer 1994, 7). Institutions in
the realist world are simply an intervening variable (13), instead of a
dependent or independent variable (Keohane and Martin 1995, 46).
Hedley Bull was the prominent “middle ground” in this
theoretical debate, and he was closely associated with the “English
School” of theorists (Linklater 2005, 85). Proponents of the English
School argue that states can form an international society, but the
system remains anarchic because they do not need to subordinate
themselves to the overarching institution (84). Theorists from the
English School are theoretically distinct from neorealists but retain the
basic premise of the anarchic system and the pessimism associated
with realism: Proponents of the English School are more likely to yield
to claims of inherent conflict and violence between states rather than
optimistic notions of mitigated conflict and long-term peace facilitated
by institutions (85).
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Thus Bull adopted a less rigid stance regarding how the anarchic
system bodes for international institutions, arguing instead that states
can overcome anarchy to form an international society (Bull 1977, 4449). States achieve this by determining that it is in their interests to
adhere to institutional rules and principles, instead of deeming such
arrangement a “detriment of their interests” (134).
Although the anarchic system does not preclude the formation of
common interstate interests, it does present some limitations.
International arrangements can “function as an instrument of state
interest and as a vehicle of transnational purposes… as maneuvers on
the part of particular powers to gain ascendancy” (Bull 1977, 49). Bull
(1982) also made the prominent argument that the European
Community’s civilian power abroad relied on the military power of its
member-states, without which it would be too weak to act
internationally.
These views persisted throughout the 1990s. Juan Medrano
(2001, 156-157) identified the following leading explanations for the
slow pace of foreign policy integration in the defense and security
arenas: the existence of the NATO alliance alleviates the need to do
so; state sovereignty in these topics is more sensitive than in other
sectors; and member-state interests are simply too divergent to allow
cooperation or even integration. Medrano, however, presented
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critiques for each and ultimately argued that the EU’s ineffective
stance abroad stems from a lack of common vision and interests, as
well as limited operational capabilities (173-174). For Medrano, “the
role of the EU in international affairs will in all likelihood remain
hostage to the differences of interest that exist between its major
states” (174). Other scholars published works with cynical titles and
claims, such as Philip Gordon’s “Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy” in
1997, in which he argued that divergent national priorities and the
difficulty in perceived shared long-term interests fundamentally
hindered the prospects for foreign policy unity.
From the neorealist literature on institutions, I will challenge the
overemphasis on the role of the state as the central unitary actor, and
the role of institutions as mere impediments or, at best, as vehicles for
state security dilemmas. This research will demonstrate that
institutions themselves can be agents of normative idea formation
through discourse.

2.2.2 Neoliberalism and Institutions
The neoliberal perspectives on institutions are more optimistic
than their neorealist counterparts. One of the most prominent
neoliberal accounts for institutions is Robert Keohane’s After
Hegemony (1984), in which he proposes regime theory. Regime theory
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argues that international regimes—which are arrangements made “as
responses to the need for policy coordination created by the fact of
interdependence” (8)—allow governments to realize objectives they
could not reach on their own (97). Furthermore, international regimes
promote international cooperation by raising the costs of violating
agreements, reducing transaction costs and uncertainty, and
facilitating information sharing (97-107). Regime theorists like
Keohane view the world as “a complex web of international
interdependencies between states, which has altered the traditional
concept of national interests and state sovereignty” (Wunderlich 2007,
22).
For Liberals, the state does indeed play a role in shaping
collective goals, such as those at the EU level: “rather than imposing
themselves on states, international institutions should respond to the
demands by states for cooperative ways to fulfill their own purposes”
(Keohane 1998). Pevehouse and Russett (2006) argue that a
particular type of institution—a densely democratic international
governmental organization—reduces the potential for militarized
interstate disputes. They attribute three causal mechanisms for
promoting peace: credible commitments, means of dispute settlement,
and socialization among actors (972-978).
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Scholars who espouse optimistic prospects for the future of the
EU as a cohesive international actor base their arguments on the
growing potential for interstate cooperation. In his book The Rise of
European Security Cooperation, Seth Jones (2007) argues that
cooperation between member-states is indeed evident outside most
hot-button foreign policy issues and thus far from a failure. Ulrich
Krotz (2009, 559-563) presents additional reasons for interstate
cooperation: Europeans tend to favor further cooperation; high-level
EU politicians promote unity; and there have been recent, albeit
gradual, successes in policy and reform. In The Quest for a European
Strategic Culture, Christoph Meyer (2006) argues that national
divergences do exist, but they have lessened in ways that favor
normative convergence.
I will challenge the neoliberal perspective on institutions to argue
that institutions not only lower costs and facilitate interstate
cooperation, but they also compel and compete with constituent states
to form narratives and ideas of their own.

2.2.3 Constructivism and Institutions
The constructivist alternative responds to the inherent
rationalism in many of the mainstream theoretical approaches briefly
outlined above. In this case, the same objective event—such as war—
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is produced by and generates very different meanings according to
history, context, and norms; a war in one context may mean
something completely different in another, and its advent may be due
to or stem from a number of ideational factors. Thus agents, their
decisions, and the social structures they generate (including
institutions) must be put into context.
Alexander Wendt is one of the leading proponents of
constructivism to challenge the rationalist tenets of realism and
liberalism (1999, 2-3). His seminal work, Social Theory of
International Politics (1999), argues that ideas matter much more than
materialist theories are willing to concede. The social system is a
single structure made up of material and ideational components (190).
Wendt is emphatic in that he does not assign greater value to ideas
over materialism and power (135). Instead, he emphasizes that ideas
are not necessarily causal, but “they constitute the ‘material base’ [of
power and interest] in the first place” (135).
Wendt’s constructivism, however, included a “structural bias”
that led to further refinement of the theoretical perspective by other
scholars in the field (Widmaier and Park 2012, 126). This structural
bias, which made identifying potential agents of change difficult, was
his emphasis on “the role of ‘exogenous shocks’ in the evolution [and
change] of system orders” (126). Critics of the structural bias argued
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that agents themselves could shape their intersubjective structures
through the use of rhetoric and persuasion (126). Martha Finnemore
and Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 895-896) unpacked the concept of norms
to argue that norms develop along a three-part “life cycle”:
emergence, cascade, and internationalization. In the emergence stage,
“norm entrepreneurs” draw attention to the norm based on a
particular organizational platform, such as an NGO (896-900). In the
cascade stage, a tipping point from the first stage allows for the norms
to diffuse and become socialized internationally, whether via
diplomatic or materialist means (902). Finally, the internationalization
phase occurs when the norm is so widely accepted internationally that
such norms appear isomorphic across societies (904-905). Thus
scholars like Finnemore and Sikkink emphasized the strategic power of
agents in promoting change (Widmaier and Park 2012, 124).
Other strands of constructivism looked to sources of change
other than strategic agents. These scholars argued that emotional,
affective, and sentimentalist influences could shape change and
interstate commitments (Widmaier and Park 2012, 129). Andrew Ross
(2006) uses the example of 9/11 to illustrate the power of affect and
emotion, particularly when they are not coherent and obvious. He
argues that micropolitical processes of emotion can shape social
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practices beyond “strictly instrumental products of affective
mobilization” (like revenge) (215).
In a study of the EU, Frierke and Wiener (1999, 725) adopt a
constructivist approach to argue the following: “[W]e are not looking
for a unidirectional relationship between preferences and outcomes,
but rather at a changing context within which identities and interests
are mutually constituted through a process of interaction. If the
meaning of a speech act is dependent on a context, it follows logically
that, if the context changes, so will the meaning of an act.” In this
regard Frierke and Wiener remain sensitive to context and diverge
from the rationalist school of thought. Domestically in target countries,
elite commitment to reform, such as pro-reform national governments,
and the establishment of new political institutions conducive to
democratic consolidations, such as higher electoral thresholds, matter
as well (Bandelj and Radu 2006).
The constructivist perspective on institutions outlined here will
serve as the foundation of this research, in which institutions are the
source of identity formation and norms. The Commission, the Council,
and the Parliament engender different narratives and ideas, which can
subsequently become impetuses for action or inaction.
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2.2.4 States and the EU as a State
The state is the primary unit in many of the mainstream theories
outlined above, but its role continues to be contested in EU studies.
The debate surrounds whether or not the EU can be conceptualized as
a state, and what the role of the traditional state is within the EU.
Scholars who study the EU sometimes have the tendency to attribute
Westphalian elements of the state to the EU, especially when they
discuss certain foreign policy issues like immigration, security, and
borders. Jan Zielonka (2006) argues that the EU is more like a neomedieval empire than a traditional state; scholars therefore travel
down a misleading road of flawed statist expectations (141). Regional
international organizations, specifically the EU, become a tool for
member-states to pursue national interests, undermining the notion of
the EU as a unitary state (140-163). Zielonka’s argument is similar to
the realist pessimism regarding the relationship between states and
regional institutions: states capitalize on the institution as a vehicle for
their own national interests rather than as a means of cooperation for
the sake of shared interests.
For Zielonka, while the EU is indeed a viable actor in the
international community, it is qualitatively different from traditional
states in terms of governance (states traditionally have hierarchical
governance), means (states traditionally have military means at their
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disposal), and objectives (traditionally linked to concerns about foreign
aggression), among others (140-163). “Finding the right balance
between principles and prudence in foreign and security policy will be
the key to Europe’s future in the field,” he argues (163).
Modern conceptualizations of the state—and whether the EU we
know today is a “state in the making” (Zielonka 2006)—are rooted in
the traditional Westphalian state. Indeed, as Hedley Bull argued in
1982, traditional powers of the state—particularly military power—
enable the EU to act internationally as a civilian power. Prior to the
modern state, authorities and identities overlapped and encompassed
multiple horizontal and vertical orders. The monarchies that preceded
the modern state were sometimes unable to exert power over local
rivals, and would instead rely on indirect rule (Tilly 1985, 174). In his
analogy of the state as a product of war and organized crime, Tilly
(1985, 169, 181-182) argues that the state is the result of four
interdependent dimensions: war making, state making, client
protection, and extraction as a means for the first three. Therefore,
the state has only come to assume monopoly of security and means to
extract (namely taxation), or grantor of such to another entity, over
time.
Other scholars built on Tilly’s argument. Daniel Beland (2005)
adds the responsibilities of state regulation and redistribution to Tilly’s
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dimensions. Venelin Ganev (2005), on the other hand, reverses Tilly’s
ideas on state-making to explain the decline of infrastructure in postcommunist states immediately after the collapse of communism. He
argues that, just as predatory elites can build a state in Tilly’s original
account, they can also destroy the infrastructure of a state against the
will of its people (Ganev 2005). This predatory behavior is unique in
that it targets “the public domain” (the object of the state’s traditional
monopoly over extraction) rather than the resources of a specific social
group (439).
Other scholars admonish not to ‘wish away’ the role of the state
and national interests. As Saskia Sassen (2003, 11-12) argues, the
state remains relevant in the negotiations of supranational entities and
some states even gain power. It is flawed to think of member-state
and EU relations as a zero-sum game of dualities (Sassen 2003). In a
more recent study, Sassen (2008) argued that basic values of the
Westphalian state—such as rule of law—have enabled the very
international institutions that we associate with globalization and
denationalization.
States can also serve to filter global processes at the
supranational level by offering citizens a means to hold supranational
entities accountable for policy (Sassen 2003, 28). Individuals are no
longer confined to the recourses afforded to them by the state, and
31

they can circumvent traditional state channels (Jacobson and Ruffer
2003; Moens and Trone, 2010). Nevertheless, as Gary Marks and
Liesbet Hooghe (1996, 4, 89) argue, political authority and influence in
the EU is shared and interconnected, not nested, and states no longer
serve as the “sole interface” between the supranational and the
subnational levels.
In this research, I respond to the debate over whether the EU
can be conceptualized as a state, and what the role of the traditional
state is within the EU. It may be misleading to apply characteristics of
the state to the EU, which does not necessarily need to embody the
features of a traditional Westphalian state. Instead, the EU may be a
new arrangement in the making, one with a common policy in some
sectors and multiple policies in others. Furthermore, the traditional
(member-)state within the EU is neither the sole unitary actor nor the
primary actor. Rather, the state pursues competing interests alongside
the institutions of the EU. This research will demonstrate how these
elements of the state develop in the EU.

2.3

Regionalism, Integration Theory, and Institutions
This research is also informed by regionalism and integration

theories as they relate to institutions. These theories help explain how
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and why institutions develop or fail to develop in the first place. The
epitome of regionalism is the EU, the only one of its kind, embodying
both supranational and intergovernmental institutions, and intertwined
more closely than any other region of the world. Although no other
regionalist project compares to the EU’s level of integration and
supranationalism, the EU serves as a model for a number of other
organizations, therefore attracting significant theoretical attention
(Duina, 2006, 268-269; Grugel, 2004, 613).
Because regionalist arrangements are institutions, theoretical
perspectives in international relations differ regarding regionalism as
they do institutions. For neorealists, regionalism is akin to the
formation of alliances, and states remain self-interested as they seek
to maximize gain and balance external economic pressures (Tassinari
2004, 20-22). It can also be a way to improve relative security for the
sake of survival in the anarchical system (Wunderlich 2007, 19).
Security, in this case, is relative to new threats, whatever form they
may take. For the EU enlargement eastward, the new “threat” may
have been economic competitiveness or the hegemonic ambitions of
large neighboring states like Russia (20). Neoliberals, on the other
hand, argue that regionalism is a way to “help reduce anarchy by
constraining state behavior”, but they go much further than

33

neorealists to say that regionalist institutions can facilitate long-term
integration and cooperation (21).
As with institutions, constructivists diverge from the state-centric
explanations of their theoretical rivals to argue that discourse,
perceptions, identity, and subnational issues—not necessarily
interstate conflict—can explain the reasons for regionalism (38). Using
the constructivist lens, one potential explanation for regionalism in the
EU would be a shared sense of regional identity and “Europeanness”
(Tassinari 2007, 29). The ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 serves as an
example of how shared identity is a compelling explanation for
integration. Although uncertainty characterized the initial years of
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, the transitional
governments of these countries attempted to distance themselves
from their communist pasts through accession to Western
organizations (Jacoby 2004, 6). Perhaps of greatest political and
economic importance was membership to the EU, which was a source
of “European” (rather than “East European”) identity.
Regionalism is referred to as either “old” or “new” in both the
temporal and substantive sense. Old regionalism, which tended to
focus on economic regional integration, figured most prominently in
the 1950s and 1960s (Duina 2006, 248). Old regionalism prioritized
“protectionism, [and] sealed internal markets or security communities”
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(Grugel, 2004, 605). Geopolitics was a secondary though important
concern, with security and stability as political priorities in the bipolar
system (Hveem, 2000, 70).
New regionalism, on the other hand, looks to political legitimacy
and identity in the context of globalization (including economically),
and moves beyond traditional notions of the Westphalian state
(Hveem, 2000, 71). Emerging towards the end of the Cold War, the
phenomenon began with the European Community’s move toward the
single market (73). New regionalism opts for “openness to global
capitalism” (Grugel, 2004, 605). It reflects a “collective action
problem,” whereby national governments are not able to effectively
pursue their goals independently (Hveem, 2000, 71).
The most relevant debate within regionalism (Wunderlich 2007,
1) for this research, is integration theory. Two integration theory
camps seek to explain how and why the institutions of the EU have
grown through the years: neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism.
Neofunctionalism was led by Ernst Haas (1961, 368, 372), who argued
that early decisions would “spillover” to other more controversial
functions in ways that promoted integration: “[P]olicies made pursuant
to an initial task and grant of power can be made real only if the task
itself is expanded.” Neofunctionalism holds that elites seek to resolve
issues at the supranational level, and a dynamic process then
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develops, in which supranational institutions respond to increased
social expectations, thereby gaining more authority and legitimacy
(Sweet and Sandholtz 2003, 221). ‘Spillover’ occurs in the pursuit of
policy goals, which stimulates further supranational integration (221).
Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholtz (1997, 307; 2003)
refined the theory further in response to the period in the 1970s of
stagnant integration. They conceded that certain junctures of
integration are marked by intergovernmental interest or resistance,
but the primary driving force remains neofunctionalist (1997, 306;
2003, 228, 237): “[States] can attempt to slow integration or push it
in directions favorable to their perceived interests, but they do not
drive the process or fully control it. In a fundamental sense,
governments are reactive, constantly adjusting to the integration that
is going on all around them.” Thomas Risse (2005, 305) added a
constructivist interpretation, and made the claim that “socialization
into European identity works…on the national levels in a process
whereby Europeanness…is gradually being embedded in
understandings of national identities.” For Risse, this means that
member-states may be receptive to EU identity in varying degrees.
Critical of the view that states lose power in the integration
process, an opposing and influential camp developed in integration
theory. Andrew Moravcsik (1993, 474), a leading liberal
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intergovernmentalist, does not believe EU integration requires its own
unique theory (as neofunctionalists do), and rather draws from
existing international relations theories of liberalism. Moravcsik argues
that EU member-states act rationally according to domestic pressures
and international strategy, and that integration does not restrict the
domestic goals of member-states (474). Intergovernmentalism holds
that leaders pursue and respond to national economic interests
through policy coordination and cooperation (Moravcsik 2003, 242).
For Moravcsik, member self-interest and state bargaining explain
integration.
This study contributes to the theoretical discussion on
regionalism and integration. As constructivists have posited, interstate
conflict is not the sole reason for regionalism and integration. Instead,
a shared sense of identity—particularly of Western democracies—is
also a source of regional organization. Many of the post-communist
new member states sought closer ties to the West, particularly the EU,
as a way to identify with Western democracy, or as a way to counter
the Russian “other”.
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2.4

Foreign Policy, Conditionality, and Institutions
The academic literature regarding foreign policy and

conditionality is important for this research, too. Perspectives on
institutional foreign policy, and conditionality as an instance thereof,
do not always adhere to mainstream international relations theories,
other than they tend to move away from the heavy neorealist
emphasis of the state (Hyde-Price 2004, 99-100). Foreign policy
analysis traditionally employs micro, individual, and actor-centered
approaches (Hudson and Vore 1995). Scholars like James Rosenau led
the push for comparative foreign policy studies across nations by
isolating key characteristics and variables, but comparative
approaches in foreign policy analysis remain relatively uncommon.
Graham Allison’s view of bureaucratic politics as a model for the
role of institutions in foreign affairs argues that issues outside foreign
policy affect decision-making in foreign policy (Allison and Halperin
1972; Hyde-Price 2004, 105). In this case, institutions base their
decisions in foreign policy on their own organizational interests, such
as resources and influence (Hyde-Price 2004, 105). Furthermore, a
given institution can have many actors within it and may not
necessarily be unitary (Allison and Halperin 1972, 43). In turn, these
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players must aggregate their interests to produce policy at the
institutional level (50).
One way institutions can exercise foreign policy is through
conditionality, or leverage: “International institutions use
conditionality… to direct policy in target states” (Epstein and
Sedelmeier 2008, 795). Following the collapse of communism, EU
decision-makers in the Commission and the Council began to devise
standards for democracy along their periphery. Armed with the
incentive of full membership, the EU exercised leverage to induce
domestic changes in institutions, polities, and laws. During
negotiations, requirements for accession were articulated by the
Copenhagen Criteria of 1993, whereby the EU Commission set forth
three sets of standards: stable institutions that guarantee democracy,
the rule of law, and human rights; a functioning market economy; and
adherence to the EU’s body of law, known as the acquis communitaire.
The EU then monitored each applicant for compliance.
As stated earlier, explanations of conditionality do not fit into
distinct theories of international relations. In fact, many of the scholars
who focus on conditionality are comparativists, not international
relations theorists. Nevertheless, traces of international relations and
the role of the state are evident in the literature on conditionality,
especially in how conditionality works: through the power of
39

asymmetries (neorealism), the power of uncertainty (neoliberalism),
or the power of norms (constructivism).
In the realist vein, conditionality is based on power asymmetries,
whereby a stronger power imposes reforms on the weaker power
(Agne 2009, 2). An example is when applicant countries adopt a law
because it is mandated and coerced by the EU to do so for accession,
not because the applicant wants to adopt the reform (2). In the liberal
vein, conditionality is based on the uncertainty of domestic actors in
the target states, their perceived status relative to the international
institution, and the credibility of policy (Epstein 2008, 9). Realist and
liberal views cite the carrot-and-stick measures of policy reform and
financial stipulations. The ‘carrots’ were membership and aid
incentives, while the ‘sticks’ were the threats of losing either or both,
as well as possible sanctions or other repercussions. These
conceptualizations of conditionality were thus materialist, rationalist,
and incentive-based. Constructivists, on the other hand, questioned
the underlying normative power of the EU instead (Epstein and
Sedelmeier 2008, 802; Johnson 2008).
Most scholars who focus on conditionality do so in terms of
power asymmetries and incentives. Milada Vachudova (2005, 63)
refers to conditionality as either passive leverage (“the attraction of EU
membership”) or active leverage (“deliberate conditionality”). In
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addition, conditionality can be positive or negative, based on
pragmatism or ideology, and consistent or inconsistent in application
(Grabbe 2002, 250). Geoffrey Pridham (2001, 69) adds that the EU
has symbolic influence as a club of Western liberal democracies, yet
applies direct pressure through policy commitments and financial aid.
Schimmelfennig et al. (2003, 497) argue that EU conditionality is
effective by positive reinforcements, i.e. rewards through material
bargaining. To induce compliance, the EU provides aid, market and
institutional access, and technical guidance. This is the causal
mechanism that Schimmelfennig et al. identify for hard leverage, but
they argue that it works under “the condition of low domestic political
costs” (514). It stands in contrast to soft leverage through the
mechanism of legitimacy and recognition, which they argue is
important, yet, not explanatory (515).
Scholars preserved a similar emphasis to power asymmetries
and incentives for the time period after the accession of new member
states, many of whom were still reforming their political, economic,
and social system. Even after a target state gains membership and the
EU as a whole loses its ultimate leverage incentive of membership, the
EU can compensate its influence through alternative mechanisms, such
as aid, trade, and socialization (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010). Ulrich
Sedelmeier (2008) suggests two additional reasons for continued
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compliance that go beyond the classic threat of sanctions and punitive
policies. First, the new members were able to increase legislative
capacity during the pre-accession period, which may account for postaccession effectiveness (820). Second, the new members may have
been socialized during the pre-accession period, which makes EU
‘shaming strategies’ effective. He argues that three possible
explanations exist for post-accession compliance with the EU in Central
Eastern Europe: the threat of sanctions, rationalist institutionalist
focus on formal legislative capacity-building, and socialization
stemming from the experience of conditionality, including ‘shaming
strategies’. Tim Haughton (2007) posits that the EU is more effective
at certain points in time; the EU’s influence, in other words, is uneven
across time. Finally, Mungiu-Pippidi (2007) assesses the issue of
‘backsliding’ in the CEE region and concludes that the issue is actually
one in which heightened expectations are now aligning with reality.
The EU as a normative unitary actor has gained traction in the
literature as well. An example of how normative power is used to
explain foreign policy in the EU is with the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP), an EU framework comprising bilateral relationships
spanning from Algeria to Ukraine to Georgia. The ENP has been
described as promoting normative influence, especially in post-Soviet
states with potential, though not immediate, aspirations to join the EU
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(Michalski 2007, 126). Nygren (2008, 126-127) argues that EU
democracy promotion efforts in the ENP were more effective in target
countries of EU hopefuls and less effective in countries with little
realistic prospect of membership: “This suggests not only that using
the stick is not enough, but that a carrot may be more effective. It
also confirms the view that whatever power the EU has, it is more of a
magnet than a gun. […] the less likely an eventual EU membership,
the more remote is the success of democracy norm dispersion.”
The power of ideas inherent in constructivism is evident in John
Meyer’s (2001) perspective on the interactions between the EU and
states. He argues that the EU serves as a democratizing force in other
nation-states through ‘otherhood’. Otherhood is “the constant
elaboration of expectation for actors” through rules and regulations
that delineate the responsibilities of said nation-states (348, 350). This
constant elaboration is an example of constructivist emphasis on the
affective influences that shape interstate change and the construction
of norms (Widmaier and Park 2012, 129). Otherhood is a powerful
network because of the institutionalized ‘culture of rationalization’ it
entails (Meyer 2001, 350). A culture of rationalization is akin to natural
law, promoting human rights and social development, among others
(350-352). Decoupling—or the (significant) gaps between policy and
practice—often results (346-347).
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The role of the EU as norm exporter is not without criticism. Jan
Zielonka (2008) adopts a critical stance of the EU as a global actor in
the democratization process. He is critical of the EU resorting to
assertive and imperialist means (e.g. economic leverage) to impose
European norms and values regionally and globally. Zielonka views the
EU as an empire that uses valuable power asymmetries to impose
political and economic conditions on weaker countries. Even globally,
the EU uses trade and trade regulation as leverage for its preferences.
He is also skeptical of global relations that appear to benefit the
recipient, because “they are at root designed to promote EU interests”
(480). In a normative sense, Zielonka believes the EU’s imperialist
approach should be replaced with a benign one that upholds the EU as
model and example.
I respond to the foreign policy and conditionality literature by
offering a crucial test case for both. Institutional cohesiveness in
foreign policy is a test for the level of integration in the EU.
Furthermore, states less receptive to the traditional conditionality
tactics of the EU, relative to the new member states of Central Europe,
suggest that the EU enjoys less influence in states where the prospects
of membership are low (Michalski 2007; Nygren 2008).
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2.5

Democracy and Democratization
Lastly, because this research observes the discursive

construction of democracy, theories on democracy and
democratization inform this study. Most of the academic discourse on
democracy stems from the comparativist literature and the rise of
liberal Western democracies in the post-War context. Among the most
influential traditional definitions of democracy are the minimalist and
procedural ones. Joseph Schumpeter (1942, 269) proposed one such
definition that described democracy as an “institutional arrangement
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.” In
Schumpeter’s democracy, minimal procedures and structures are in
place for elite competition, and voters choose among the competing
elites.
Other scholars built on Schumpeter’s minimalist definition,
namely Robert Dahl (1971), who adopted a procedural understanding
of democracy. He used the term ‘polyarchy’ to describe advanced
Western liberal political systems as incomplete democracies,
characterized by various dimensions of rights and freedoms designed
to allow citizens to develop and demonstrate their preferences, and to
protect them from discrimination against those preferences (2-3).
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Minimalist definitions inspired by Schumpeter and Dahl persist today.
Adam Przeworski (1999, 23), who views democracy as simply a
system in which rulers are elected, argues that additional criteria
beyond this minimalist definition are important for the quality of
democracy and its prospects for survival but not for the definition itself
(50).
Many scholars, however, sought to move beyond minimalist
conceptions of democracy toward structural arguments that focused on
social and economic dimensions. This trend was evident among
modernization theorists, like Seymour Lipset (1959, 82-82), who
argued that economic development facilitates democracy through
factors such as urbanization, literacy, media, and industrialization,
which produce a diamond-shaped rather than pyramid-shaped social
structure conducive to democracy. Samuel Huntington (1968) was
influential in his caution that modernization would lead to instability
without the proper institutions to absorb the social shock of
modernization, and that political order would have to precede
democracy instead. For Huntington, institutions were crucial to channel
the shifts in values and expectations generated by modernization (32).
In response to modernization theory, Adam Przeworski and Fernando
Limongi (1997, 177) argued that, while economic development does
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not cause democracy per se, greater economic development improves
the likelihood of democracy’s survival once it is established.
With the collapse of Portuguese and Spanish authoritarianism in
the mid-1970s, a new era emerged which came to be known as the
‘third wave of democratization’ (Huntington 1991). The literature on
democracy shifted to a greater focus on studies of the transition away
from non-democracy (and many assumed toward democracy),
oftentimes posing arguments that favored agency over structure.
Perhaps the clearest distinction between transitions and
democratization is provided by Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillippe
Schmitter (1986, 6): A transition is the period between the fall of one
regime and the rise of another in its place. The term democratization
is more complex (8): “the processes whereby the rules and procedures
of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously
governed by other principles… or expanded to include persons not
previous enjoying such rights and obligations… or extended to cover
issues and institutions not previously subject to citizenship
participation.” O’Donnell and Schmitter also stress that
democratization and liberalization—that is, “the process of making
effective certain rights that protect both individuals and social groups
from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state or third parties”—
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are not synonymous, since nondemocratic regimes can liberalize
without democratizing (7-9).
One of the most important contributions to transitology was
Dankwart Rustow’s (1970) account of the transitions process. Rustow
was critical of his contemporaries on democratization, whom he viewed
as exploring the factors conducive to democracy rather than asking
“the genetic questions of how democracy comes into being in the first
place” (338-340). Thus he proposed a four-part model to transitions:
national unity as a necessary precondition, a preparatory phase of
political struggle, a decision phase of leadership deliberation over
crucial features of democracy, and a Darwinian-like habituation phase
in which democracy becomes increasingly ‘palatable’. Rustow’s
redirection away from the social and economic structural arguments of
his contemporaries served as a model for a generation of scholarship
that valued agency and elites.
Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O’Donnell, and J. Samuel
Valenzuela (1992) unpacked the concept of “transitions” further. They
argued that two transitions actually occur: one from liberalization of an
authoritarian regime to the installation of a democratically elected
government, and the second from democratically elected government
to democratic consolidation (1-3). Democratic consolidation refers to
the institutionalization of democratic rules, a definition that is
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presented in more complex terms by other scholars (Mainwaring et al.
1992, 69; Schedler 1998). Democratic consolidation is also described
simply as when political actors accept democracy as “the only game in
town” (a phrase first attributed to Giuseppe di Palma but later used
widely in the literature). Samuel Huntington also sought to contribute
to the idea of democratic consolidation. In The Third Wave (1991), a
book that identifies historical patterns and waves of democratization,
he used a minimalist-procedural definition of democracy to identify a
test for democratic consolidation: the two turnover test of democracy,
in which a “peaceful transfer of power” occurs through elections twice
(266-67).
Overall, one of the more comprehensive and influential books on
transitions, democratization, and consolidation is Problems of
Democratic Transition and Consolidation by Juan Linz and Alfred
Stepan (1996). Their research identifies various factors central to
transitions, including macro-level (stateness, prior regime type), actorcentered (leadership base of the prior regime, who initiates and
controls a transition), and contextual (political economy, constitutionmaking environments, and international influences). Democratic
consolidation, furthermore, comprises five arenas (7-12): civil society,
political society, rule of law, a useable bureaucracy, and economic
society. They also contributed to the field with a classification scheme
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of actors, leadership, and regime types that subsequently shape the
transition path of a given case.
In recent decades, scholars began to adopt a more critical stance
regarding the central assumption in the democratization literature that
transitions are moving toward democracy. Avoiding the genetic
questions that Rustow once proposed, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way
(2002) focus on functional questions and consider how transitions may
lead to ‘hybrid’ nondemocratic regimes. Levitsky and Way worried
about the “democratizating bias” in the transitions literature, adding
that it was “overly optimistic” (51, 64). Their healthy skepticism was a
central concern in the literature around the time of the initial color
revolutions in the ‘real world’.
I will base my methodological framework from the
democratization literature. I discuss how concepts of democracy will
relate to the research in the next chapter.

2.6

Research Agenda and Theoretical Framework
Contemporary scholars who have explicitly refuted or supported

the notion of the EU as a unitary actor in foreign policy base their
claim on their respective analyses of competing and divergent national
interests among the member-states. For scholars who are optimistic of
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the EU, this implies that common ground among member-states in a
particular policy issue is sufficient for the EU to act as a unitary actor.
This research contributes to the discussion by analyzing an additional
layer to determine if the EU is a unitary actor: divergent institutional
powers and interests within the EU itself. Thus inter-institutional
common ground is necessary in addition to common ground between
member-states in a given policy area.
Theories on international relations and integration reveal the
tenuous balance between states and international institutions, and
between structure and agency. And scholarly contributions to the
topics of conditionality, leverage, and the role of the EU in Central and
Eastern Europe suggest that the EU has very limited “soft” influence in
regions further east, where states have little intent or possibility of
joining the EU—the “magnet” and “carrot” of membership is virtually
nonexistent. The EU can, however, exercise “hard” conditionality
through more traditional disincentives, namely punitive policies such
as withholding aid. The democratization literature provides a basis for
understanding each institution’s conceptualization of democracy, as
revealed by the discourse.
This study builds a research agenda across different theoretical
debates. The results of the study will impart a theoretical discussion
regarding international relations, the role of the state, the
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development of institutions and institutional authority, and the power
of foreign policy and conditionality. It contributes to mainstream
international relations theory by arguing that international institutions
need not be solely vehicles of state interest; instead states can find
common ground for cooperation. Also, there may be limits to how
liberal institutionalists explain the role of institutions relative to their
constituent states.
This research will treat the EU and its member-states as
potentially unitary actors in foreign affairs. Furthermore, institutions
develop identities and construct meanings through norms and
discourse. For the development of EU institutions, this means that
“spillover” is not inevitable, but instead is punctuated by the growing
pains of institutional change and adjustment. Such institutional
dynamics are evident in cases where states are less incentivized to
follow conditionality policies despite apparent power asymmetries. The
concluding chapter will return to these issues and address theoretical
implications.
The next chapter will discuss the methodological framework
behind this research. It will propose qualitative methods to uncover
the extent to which institutions promote or hinder the EU as an actor
in the international community and in foreign policy.
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Chapter 3: Research Methods
3.1

Introduction
To determine whether the institutions of the EU have different

stakes in foreign affairs and to determine when a particular institution
employs democratic discourse, this research utilizes interpretive,
qualitative content and discourse analysis of EU institutional
documents from an extensive database built for this study. It explores
how the EU produces and constructs democratic norms through formal
discourse on post-Soviet states. The study relates to how EU
institutions use discursive resources to publicly delineate their stance
in foreign matters. Institutional documents reflect an official posturing
of that stance, representative of the institution as a whole rather than
representative of an actor within. In this chapter, I outline the
research methods that will uncover essential inter-institutional
dynamics in the EU. I address the following issues: first, the research
questions; second, the hypothesized relationship between variables;
third, the research design; fourth, the specific research steps involved;
and, finally, concluding remarks on methodological trade-offs.
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3.2

The Problem and the Questions
Despite the prominent role of the EU as a unitary global actor in

the political, economic, and social transitions of the post-Soviet
satellites in Central and Eastern Europe, the notion of the EU as a
unitary global actor is far from settled. This study argues that
divergent institutional interests undermine the EU on the world stage.
To examine these dynamics, it observes democratic discourse in EU
documents of three leading institutions across three case studies, and
poses the following questions.

Q1

How are EU relations with former Soviet non-memberstates portrayed by each institution? What are the roles,
powers, and interests of the institutions in such cases?

Q2

To what extent do the institutions of the EU converge or
diverge in approaches to foreign policy? Do the different
institutions of the EU promote or hinder the EU’s ability to
act as a global unitary actor?
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Q3

How do the institutions of the EU construct democratic
discourse in each case? What are the patterns of discourse
across EU institutions?

Q4

Why do EU institutions vary in their approaches to foreign
affairs? What explains points of divergence or
convergence?

3.3

Hypothesis
This research assesses the impact of institutional power levels

and stakes abroad (explanatory variables) as evident in democratic
discourse used in foreign policy (outcome variable). The outcome
variable seeks to capture EU institutional (dis)unity in policy.
The institutions of the EU have different stakes and vested
interests at risk in foreign policy commitments and outcomes; the
greater the stake, the less democratic rhetoric is used. That is, the
institutional actor with the lowest stakes in outcomes, the Parliament,
will be most likely to use democratic discourse in reference to the nonmember-state in question, because the limited impact of its discourse
on reform in target states and limited accountability allow it to make
bolder statements. Lower stakes in outcomes also allow the institution,
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in this case the Parliament, to pursue its own interests within the EU
itself. As the only democratically elected body in the EU, the
Parliament can foster identity formation as the beacon of democratic
discourse and thus reflect its internal origins and character. The
Parliament forms and reinforces its identity as a democratic institution
by constructing narratives and pursuing interests commensurate with
democracy—particularly by way of democratic discourse. This study
will demonstrate instances of such narratives in the case studies.
This inverse relationship is hypothesized to be the case, since
greater institutional authority abroad based on the legally binding
treaties of the EU leads to greater responsibility and accountability.
Conversely, if an institution has less authority in foreign affairs, then it
faces fewer repercussions when using democratic discourse, as it will
likely not be held accountable for the fulfillment of such norms in
relationships with target states. This contrast between greater and
lesser authority reflects an inherent trade-off for realpolitik, whereby
more powerful institutions consider the pragmatic ramifications of
discourse. Pragmatic ramifications matter for the more powerful
institutions, because their ability to exert pressure over a target state
relies on power asymmetries (see earlier discussion in § 2.4 on
conditionality).
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Because the meaning of democracy is unsettled and even
contested in the EU (to be discussed in §3.4.3 on the conceptualization
of democracy), each institution can use democratic discourse at its
discretion. If an institution has less authority in foreign affairs,
however, the institution risks fewer repercussions when using
democratic discourse, as it will likely not be held accountable for the
fulfillment of democratic norms in EU relationships with nondemocratic
states.

3.4

Research Design
This research seeks to uncover the construction of democracy

across EU institutions through discourse. It looks to case studies
outside the EU, because discursive meaning emerges from the focus
on “others”, which allows for the “development of intersubjective
understandings […] intersubjectivities occur in the context of
communicative action involving processes of persuasion and advocacy
that go beyond the utilitarian exchange of preferences…” (Rosamond
1999, 659). This research searches for intersubjectivity by identifying
how democracy is conceptualized vis-à-vis Ukraine, Georgia, and
Kyrgyzstan through an iterative process. Furthermore, if the
Commission, the Council, and the Parliament display similar
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discourses, then the prospects for institutional cohesion and the ability
of the EU to act as a unitary actor abroad are more favorable. If the
three institutions fail to display similar discourses and instead
demonstrate very different priorities and concerns, then the reverse is
likely.
This section of the chapter explains how documents were
selected and analyzed in terms of the research questions. First, it
outlines the overarching strategies that frame the research design.
Second, it presents the specific methodological tools used in the
research. Third, it presents the case selection over which the
methodology was executed. Fourth, it outlines the specific data used,
including parameters and selection.

3.4.1.Methodological Strategies
Before outlining specific methodological parameters, I will
explain the overall strategies applied. This research was driven by the
following overall strategies: diachronic and synchronic strategies to
capture time and space; and exploratory research techniques. First, to
test the hypothesis, this research used a dual approach—diachronic
and synchronic strategies. Diachronic research observes democratic
discourse across time and over the span of nine years (2003-2011). In
this study, the purpose of the diachronic component is to capture the
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impact of context on discourse, as well as the gradual nature of
discursive constructions of meaning (Malmvig 2006, 30). Synchronic
research, on the other hand, observes democratic discourse across
space. In this study, the purpose of a synchronic component is to
capture a particular moment that transpired across space and which
ought to have been most ripe for democratic discourse: the color
revolutions. The two strategies are complementary yet distinct; the
former allows for observing the dynamic and gradual nature of
democratic discourse, such as changes in what is included or excluded
in discourse over time and patterns, while the latter allows for
democratic discourse to be captured during a particularly receptive
point in recent history.
Second, when researchers embark on the theoretical and
empirical world, they construct research designs characterized by
confirmatory or exploratory strategies (Gerring 2001, 155). As the
labels suggest, confirmatory research “envisions empirical analysis as
a process of confirming or disconfirming a previously stipulated
hypothesis,” while exploratory research is “a process of mutual
adjustment” between concepts, theories, and evidence with the goal of
discovery (231). Researchers tend to fall in between the two extremes
(155, 230-232), though this research leans toward the latter. This is
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because—more often than not—the puzzles of inquiry in social science
are too complex to be reduced to standards of natural science.
Exploratory approaches value knowledge through understanding
the complexities of the empirical world. Exploratory qualitative
researchers point to the contributions of interpretivist Clifford Geertz
(1973), who was known as a proponent of “thick description.” He paid
close attention to context, especially cultural, which he described as a
“web of significance” (5). Another source of influence is the argument
by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966, 39), who do not seek
to eliminate subjectivity and instead offer the example of language as
a source of both objectivity and subjectivity.

3.4.2 Specific Methodological Tools
Within the interpretivist paradigm outlined above, this research
employed an iterative process of qualitative content and discourse
analysis as methodological tools. Defined simply, content analysis is
“organizing information into categories related to the central questions
of the research” (Bowen 2009, 32), while discourse analysis is the
study of written texts or spoken language (Peräkylä and Ruusuvuori
2011, 530). The purpose is to use iterative readings of institutional
documents to uncover themes and meanings (531). The texts
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therefore serve as “specimen” or data of the world the researcher is
exploring (531).
Qualitative content analysis, as used in this research, is distinct
from traditional quantitative content analysis. The latter uses random
selection (for statistical validity) to count word usage and later tests it
for statistical significance (Zhang and Wildemuth 2009, 2). The former,
on the other hand, purposively selects texts to identify categories,
patterns, and meanings (2). In this research, qualitative content
analysis is part of the initial stages of research, particularly data
selection.
Discourse analysis plays a predominant role in the empirical
analysis phases of research. According to Stuart Hall (1997), meanings
are produced and circulated through culture and language. Two ways
of assessing such meanings, he argues, are through semiotic research
(which systematically studies how signs and language serve as the
‘vehicle’ for meaning in culture) and through discursive research. Hall
(1997, 6) defines discourses as “ways of referring to or constructing
knowledge about a particular topic of practice,” which “define what is
and is not appropriate in our formulation of, and our practices in
relation to, a particular subject.” Thus, while semiotics contemplates
the ‘how’ of language, discourse contemplates the ‘effects’ of it (Hall
1997).
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Discourse analysis was executed systematically across the case
studies by carefully examining the immediate and wider contexts of
the document; by identifying which dimensions of democracy were
emphasized and which were not emphasized; and by determining
patterns, convergences, and divergences across institutions. The text
was deconstructed to infer meaning and to reveal overarching themes
beyond the document itself. The specific ways in which these
methodologies were applied are elaborated in section IV of this
chapter.

3.4.3 Key Concepts
The core concepts of this study are rooted in academic debates
and literature. The following sections capture key concepts of this
research.
Democracy, Democratic Discourse, and Democratic Norms
The EU’s political criteria for membership require stable
institutions that can guarantee democracy, the rule of law, and human
rights. The EU, however, never defines democracy explicitly and
instead relies on subjective assessments to monitor criteria fulfillment.
The closest semblance to a definition of democracy is the EU
Commission’s 1999 description of democratization (Table 1). This
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definition is neither authoritative nor representative of the EU position
as a whole, since there is no common position on the definition of
democracy.
Table 1: European Commission Regulation on Democratization
Processes, 1999
(a) promoting and strengthening the rule of law
(b) promoting the separation of powers
(c) promoting pluralism both at the political level and at the level of
civil society by strengthening the institutions needed to maintain
the pluralist nature of that society
(d) promoting good governance
(e) promoting the participation of the people in the decision-making
process at national
(f) support for electoral processes
(g) supporting national efforts to separate civilian and military
functions
Source: European Commission

The EU stance on what democracy means is a mostly procedural
notion with a few substantive elements, but this research questions
how democracy is constructed and conceptualized vis-à-vis cases in
post-Soviet space. Due to the lack of an operational definition by the
EU, the working definition for democracy in my research was rooted in
the academic literature.
Larry Diamond and Leonard Morlino (2004; also Przeworski
1999) identify four minimal requisites for democracy: “1) universal,
adult suffrage; 2) recurring, free, competitive, and fair elections; 3)
more than one serious political party; and 4) alternative sources of
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information” (21). Beyond the minimal requisites, they add notions of
democratic quality to their framework, such as substantive content
and results. This research utilizes the insights of Diamond and Morlino
as an operational basis for research. Their conceptualization of
democracy is influenced by both institutional and procedural
perspectives, and the dimensions and indicators they use stem from
experiences following the third wave of democratization.
Although the EU neither defines nor commits to a specific
definition, its stated conceptualization of democratization does indeed
reveal a baseline adherence to procedural elements very similar to
those of Diamond and Morlino. The Diamond and Morlino framework
offers viable indicators and theoretical grounding for this analysis.
Based on their framework, the following indicators will be useful during
the review of empirical textual data (Diamond and Morlino 2004): rule
of law can be identified through references to legal and judicial
structures, and legal rights and clarity; political participation is evident
through references to enfranchisement, political parties, civil society,
and political discourse; political competition is linked to electoral
references; and accountability may be described as inter-institutional
or via free media and information.
To complement Diamond and Morlino, this study also draws
indicators from a collaborative effort between various scholars in the
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field (Coppedge et al. 2011). They disaggregate several
conceptualizations of democracy into component parts and into viable
indicators for research. The 33 indicators they present range from
procedural to substantive elements of democracy. Table 2 synthesizes
the indicators of democracy for this research based on the
contributions of Diamond and Morlino, and Coppedge et al. This table
serves as the operational framework and conceptual basis of
democracy in the research.
Table 2: Indicators of Democracy
Dimension of
Democracy
Rule of Law and
Sovereignty

Participation

Indicators (Where to look for the
dimension)
 Legal system
 State institutions
 Courts
 Basic rights
 Equality under the Law
 Legal clarity and predictability
 Executive’s adherence to law
 Legal authority extends throughout the
territory claimed as part of the polity
 Polity is able to govern itself in domestic and
foreign policies without external interference
 Enfranchisement
 Participation in political parties
 Political discourse
 Political culture tolerates diversity
 Access to basic education
 Level of participation in elections
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Table 2 (Continued): Indicators of Democracy
Dimension of
Democracy
Competition
(National and
subnational levels)

Vertical
Accountability
(Leader is
accountable to
citizen)
Horizontal
Accountability
(Inter-institutional
monitoring and
separation of
powers)

Civil Society and
Political Freedoms

Indicators (Where to look for the
dimension)
 Regular, free, fair, on time elections
 Independent electoral commission
 Candidate access to the ballot
 Competition without government interference
 Votes counted and allocated fairly
 Candidate access to media
 Party institutionalism and centralized
 Defined, consistent, and coherent party
ideology
 Lack of barriers for small party
representation
 Major media outlets are free and
independent

Checks and balances by independent
authorities
 Highest judicial bodies are independent of
the outside influences
 Highest judicial bodies can review
governmental actions in light of
constitutional provisions
 Institutional decisions respected by the other
institutions
 Separation of civilian and military
 Freedoms are properly protected
 Citizens enjoy freedom of speech and
freedom from politically motivated
persecution by government
 Property rights are protected
 Freedom of religion is guaranteed
 Civil society is independent of the state and
able to voice opinions critical of politics
 Civil society is engaged in politics


66

Table 2 (Continued): Indicators of Democracy
Dimension of
Democracy
Progressive Politics

Responsiveness

Indicators (Where to look for the
dimension)
 Addressing social inequalities
 Access to income, education, and health
resources
 Women achieve equal representation in
government
 Underprivileged ethnic groups are granted
formal rights and their representation
 Citizens and permanent residents enjoy the
protections of the law
 Citizen satisfaction and democratic
legitimacy

Sources: Diamond and Morlino (2004), Coppedge et al. (2011)

To summarize, the following definitions will hold for this
research.


Democratic Discourse: conceptualized as communication that
addresses democracy, as defined above. It is operationalized as
textual references to the EU’s views on democratization, as
outlined in Table 1, and as textual references to the operational
terms outlined in Table 2.



Democratic Norms: conceptualized as “rules for conduct that
provide standards by which behavior is approved or disapproved”
(Hechter 1987, 62). It is operationalized as textual references to
the “indicators” listed in Table 2.
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Institutional Authority and Power
Institutions are defined in this study as a set of rules and
constraints that shape interaction and outcomes (North 1990, 3; Jones
et al. 2003, 153-154). Institutional authority and power is an
institution’s ability to demand and enforce. One way authority and
power is commonly exercised by the EU is conditionality, or external
leverage. Conditionality is the "exercise of policy instruments by one
party to secure compliance and shape the actions of another party,” as
described earlier in this study, and it can be formal or informal. The
former can be identified when conditions or pre-conditions are publicly
stated, whereas the latter manifests through recommendations or
pressure rather than explicit prerequisites.
Institutional Stakes
Stakes are conceptualized as the vested interests of institutions
regarding outcomes. References to ‘institutional stakes’ will mean the
vested interests at risk in the outcome. Stakes will be identified
according to what the institution perceives it stands to gain relative to
what it stands to lose. The first measure of perceived loss will be
competing issues on the institution’s agenda (Levitsky and Way 2005,
21). In the Commission, a competing interest is the prospect of
membership in a target state, since the Commission is the primary
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institution that leads membership negotiations. In the Council, a
competing interest is immigration or energy resources, since the
member-states channel national concerns through the Council. In the
Parliament, a competing interest is gaining more institutional power
relative to the other institutions, since it remains the weakest of the
three in decision-making. The second measure of perceived loss, or
stakes, will be the level of linkage to the target state (case study).
Linkages are observable in levels of economic (investments,
assistance), geopolitical (ties to Western organizations), and social
(tourism, migration) ties to the EU (Levitsky and Way 2005, 22).

3.4.4 Case Selection
To examine the research questions, this study selected three
cases to observe how institutions (the units of analysis) construct
democracy outside the EU. The following criteria for case selection
applied.
First, the case had to be a non-member-state in post-Soviet
space. This criterion is based on precedence that the EU acts most
cohesively in democratization promotion efforts in Central Eastern
Europe (the newest member-states of the EU). Second, the case had
to have little immediate prospects for EU membership. “Immediate
prospects” is defined as any formal indication or early sign of
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membership negotiation, specifically whether the EU formally
categorizes a country as a “candidate” (countries officially allowed to
begin the long membership process) or “potential candidate”
(countries that have been publicly promised the possibility of
membership in the future). The membership process is very gradual
and formalized, and only Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro,
and Turkey are current candidates who have embarked on
membership negotiations. In 2003, furthermore, the EU formally
endorsed Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro as
future members of the EU; the EU publicly classifies these countries as
potential candidates. This second criterion is based on the premise
that the EU enjoys more conditionality and leverage, due to the lure of
membership, in cases designated as potential candidates.
Third, the country and the EU had to have active engagement
with each other. Active engagement is defined as one with a relevant
regional framework in effect (the European Neighborhood Policy for
Ukraine and Georgia, and the Central Asia Strategy for Kyrgyzstan, as
well as regular bilateral negotiations on domestic and international
affairs). Active engagement reflects ongoing cooperation rather than
sporadic and limited talks (an instance of the latter is Belarus, with
which the EU restricts cooperation). It also indicates that there are
costs and gains at stake in the relationship. Two sets of existing EU
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regional policy fit the third criterion: the Central Asia Strategy (which
covers Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan), and the Eastern Partnership (which includes Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). The remaining
regional frameworks of the EU were excluded, because their scopes
extended beyond the research and included numerous countries
outside former Soviet space. This third criterion is based on data
availability from which to draw discursive findings; if relations are
limited such that discourse is limited, then identifying patterns of
discourse may not be possible.
The final criterion was to identify crucial case studies based on a
most-likely design (Gawrich et al. 2010; George and Bennett 2005)—
that is, cases most likely to elicit democratic discourse from the EU.
Three major cases of ‘color revolutions’, or large-scale movements
espousing democratization, were selected: Georgia, Ukraine, and
Kyrgyzstan. The three cases provide variance on the explanatory
variables—institutional power and stake abroad—as well. If
institutional power is considered an institution’s ability to demand and
enforce (exemplified in EU conditionality), then EU institutional power
would likely be higher in places where it is unrivaled. The primary rival
for political influence in the region is Russia, and Russia enjoys the
most diplomatic leverage in Kyrgyzstan, notable leverage in Ukraine,
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and less diplomatic leverage in Georgia, relative to one another.
Conversely, the lure of EU membership and partnership is highest in
Georgia, notable in Ukraine, and least in Kyrgyzstan. For reasons
outlined in this section, the final case selection is Georgia, Ukraine,
and the Kyrgyz Republic. This final criterion is conducive to a mostlikely scenario, in which the color revolutions may present a potentially
rich context to explore patterns of democratic discourse, and in which
a lack thereof would similarly indicate important implications.

3.4.5 Data Selection
This research uses texts representative of the three EU
institutions: the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament.
Institutional documents are central data, because “discourses are
embodied in texts” and “discourse analysis involves the systematic
study of texts to find evidence of their meaning and how this meaning
translates into a social reality” (Hardy et al. 2004, 20). The
parameters of the text documents (data selection) include: release by
one of the three EU institutions; a focus on the selected case study
regions as a whole or the specific country; and addresses foreign
affairs from the perspective of one of the qualifying EU institutions
(rather than NGO perspectives on humanitarian issues, for instance).
Non-institutional document sources, such as media coverage, are
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excluded because the research questions institutional and formal
discourse. Text data from speech acts are only included if they present
an official discourse on behalf of one of the three institutional entities,
and if they were subsequently officially released as text documents.
Therefore, texts from speech acts that do not officially represent an
institution are excluded. The data must be authored and released by
one of the following institutions.
1. EU Commission (‘the Commission’): The Commission is the
most supranational of the institutions.
2. Council of the European Union (‘the Council’, not to be
confused with the ‘European Council’): The Council is the most
intergovernmental institution, because national ministers
represent national interests and meet in a given policy area to
make EU decisions.
3. European Parliament (‘the Parliament’): The EP is the only
directly-elected institution of the EU. There are 754 members
that represent 500 million citizens across 27 member-states
for 5 year terms.

The data selection is thus based on time (2003-2011), space
(case study selection), and unit of analysis (institution). Based on
these criteria, a database was created. The source of all textual data
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included in the database is the electronic archives of the European
Union. This process is described in the next section.

3.5

Building the Database
For each of the three institutions in question, data were collected

and stored in the qualitative analysis software program, Atlas.ti, which
was used to manage all data for the research. Atlas.ti is Qualitative
Data Analysis software designed for unstructured data—that is, data
not amenable to statistical analysis. It allows the researcher to
organize, code, track, and visualize very large quantities of primary
data.
For the research, data were collected from official EU archival
sources via official web portals according to the following criteria: (1)
the document must be officially authored and released by the
Commission, the Council, or the Parliament; (2) the document must
relate to Georgia, the Caucasus, Ukraine, the European Neighborhood
Policy, the Kyrgyz Republic, or Central Asia; and (3) the document
must fit into the 2003-2011 time frame.
To summarize the complex process, thousands of documents
were collected and compiled into a raw database of data meeting the
three basic criteria. The raw database of 3,014 pieces of data was
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coded with democracy-related codes, and then content analysis was
used to filter out those documents lacking democracy-related codes.
After using content analysis, the filtered database shrank to 2,410
pieces of data. The final step was to use qualitative analysis of the
codes to select 230 documents for review from the raw database.
Thus, content analysis allowed for filtering the database, while
qualitative review allowed for the final data selection. The filtered
database was used throughout the research as the reference database,
although the 230 documents ultimately served as the data for
qualitative discourse analysis.

3.5.1 From Raw Database to Filtered Database
The criteria yielded a total of 3,014 documents—1,243 for the
Commission; 1,573 for the Council; and 198 for the Parliament. The
numerical discrepancy between institutional sources—particularly the
Parliament—should not be methodologically alarming for reasons
described later in this chapter. The 3,014 documents comprised the
initial database of raw data in Atlas.ti. This initial raw database would
undergo further filters to eventually yield the final database for
research.
Once the raw database was established with documents meeting
the three criteria listed above, the next step was coding. Coding in
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Atlas.ti is akin to highlighting textual references in hard copies. The
purpose of coding is to set the foundation for content analysis, which
relies on a qualitative review of word occurrences and frequencies. The
codes were based on the conceptualization of democracy from Table 2.
A list of codes and the corresponding keywords use to generate them
can be found in the codebook in Table 3.

Table 3: Atlas.ti Codes (Codebook)
Indicator

Code Name

Georgia
Ukraine
Kyrgyzstan

CASE::GEORGIA
CASE::UKRAINE
CASE::KYRGYZREP

Democracy
Rule of Law
and
Sovereignty

00DEMOCRACY
01RULEOFLAWSOV

Participation

02PARTICIPATION

Competition
(National and
Subnational)

03COMPETITION

Vertical
Accountability

04VERTACCOUNTAB

Corresponding Atlas.ti
Keywords for Coding
“georgi*”, “caucas*”
“ukrain*”
“kyrgy*”, “kirghiz*”,
“kirgiz*”, “central asia*”
“democra*”
“rule of law”, “sovereign*”,
“court” , “rights” , ,
“equal*”, “territor*”,
“judicia*”, “laws”, “legal*”
“particip*”, “political
participation”, “civic
participation”, “*franchis*”,
“suffrage”, “diversity”,
“education”, “elect*”
“elect*”, “political
competition”, “party
competition”, “electoral
commission”, “ballot*”,
“vot*”, “media”, “party”,
“parties”
“media”, “news”,
“internet”, “accountab*”
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Table 3 (Continued): Atlas.ti Codes (Codebook)
Indicator

Code Name

Corresponding Atlas.ti
Keywords for Coding
Horizontal
05HORIZACCOUNTAB “separation of powers”,
Accountability
“accountab*”, “independent
institutions”, “institutional
independence”,
“institutions are
independent”, “institution is
independent”, “check*”,
“judicial review”, “civilian*”
Civil Society
06CIVSOCPOLFREE
“civil society”, “freedom*”,
and Political
“freedom of”, “freedom
Freedoms
from”, “property rights”,
“plural*”
Progressive
07PROGRESSIVEPOL “progressive”, “social”,
Politics
“income”, “*employ*”,
“educat*”, “health”,
“human”, “women*”,
“female”, “gender”,
“ethnic”, “minority”,
“underprivileged”,
“underrepresented”,
“divers*”, “plural*”
Responsiveness 08RESPONSIVENESS “responsive*”, “legitima*”,
“satisf*”
Sources: Codebook based on concepts from Diamond and Morlino (2004), and
Coppedge et al. (2011)

Once the database of 3,014 documents was fully coded
according to the codebook (Table 3), the next step was to utilize
qualitative content analysis to eliminate documents without any of the
democracy-related codes. Qualitative content analysis requires
categories and a coding scheme to be developed (Zhang and
Wildemuth 2009, 4), in this case deductively from the theoretical
framework on democracy. The codes were checked for consistency in a
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sample of text first, a “test run”. The testing phase demonstrated that
the European Union addresses democracy-related issues in an often
direct manner, and it revealed that the codebook developed for this
research project would be appropriate for generating an appropriate
amount of data.
Once the sample text was tested, the codes were applied to the
entire database. The codes were executed in Atlas.ti in a two-part
process. First, the system was programmed to auto code the indicators
of democracy from the codebook (numbers 01-08), a process which
consisted of programming the software with each code and its
constituent keywords, followed by a very time-consuming process of
the software scanning each and every word across the 3,014
documents. Second, code “00DEMOCRACY”, which is the explicit use of
variants of the word ‘democracy’, was not autocoded. Instead, every
single occurrence of the code was manually reviewed to omit irrelevant
usage, such as a reference to the “Democratic Republic of the Congo”.
Relevance and irrelevance was judged according to one question
alone: is the use of “democra*” pertaining to one of the case studies?
If not, the phrase would not be coded “00DEMOCRACY”; if so, it would
be labeled as such.
Once this two-step process was complete, the database was fully
labeled with all codes from the codebook in Table 3. Keeping in mind
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that all documents in the raw database already met the case study and
temporal scope parameters, the coding process revealed close to a
third of the documents did not contain any reference to the nine
democracy-related terms from the codebook, as well as their
indicators. These documents were removed from the database, which
yielded the filtered database [Table 4(B)]. A summary of how the
database developed is displayed in Table 4. Column one identifies the
stage of the database and data selection process; column two provides
the total number of data; column three provides a breakdown by
institution; and column four lists the quantity of codes in the database.

Table 4: Database and Data Selection

(A) Raw
database
(B) Filtered
Database
After
deleting
data without
coding
(C) Data
with Coded
Democratic
Discourse &
Case Study

Total
Docs
3,014

2,410

Total Docs by
Institution
Commission: 1,243
Council: 1,573
Parliament: 198
Commission: 953
Council: 1,321
Parliament: 136

Total Occurrences Across
Data
00DEMOCRACY: 450
01RULEOFLAWSOV: 17,853
02PARTICIPATION: 12,836
03COMPETITION: 9,301
04VERTACCOUNTAB: 3,341
05HORIZACCOUNTAB: 2,886
06CIVSOCPOLFREE: 2,133

230

Commission: 100
Council: 82
Parliament: 48

07PROGRESSIVEPOL: 22,676
08RESPONSIVENESS: 1,098
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The filtered database, Section “B”, was used as the dataset for
this research, while data from Section “C” were those emphasized for
discursive analysis. Data from Section “C” contain the code
“00DEMOCRACY”, which is the explicit reference to democracy
(“democra*”) and a case study as determined from a qualitative
content review of the data.
This research questions the limits of the EU as a unitary actor in
the world stage by examining convergences and divergences in
institutional democratic discourse regarding non-member-states in
post-Soviet space during the years 2003-2011. It expects a negative
relationship between institutional authority abroad and levels of
democratic discourse. The research design uses qualitative content
and discourse analysis methodologies to examine three major
institutions of the EU—the Commission, Council, and Parliament—as
evident in three case studies—Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz
Republic. The analysis is based on deductive reasoning from
theoretical frameworks on democracy. The data were compiled into a
database. They were stored, organized, and analyzed using Atlas.ti
Qualitative Data Analysis software.
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3.6

Potential Limitations of Methodology
The main drawbacks in this research stem from the limited scope

of EU relations with the cases relative to EU relations elsewhere in
former Soviet space, such as the former republics of Yugoslavia. The
EU, however, has substantially increased ties to the case studies. Also,
the very different historical contexts of the Caucasus, Eastern
European, and Central Asia make comparison difficult. Though close
qualitative sensitivity to such differences helps mitigate the issue, this
research does not compare the case studies to one another, but rather
compares the institutions. This is precisely why the cases serve as
vignettes or snapshots of EU institutional involvement. Another
tradeoff stems from the selection of official institutional documents as
data, as opposed to interviews, for instance. I argue that official
documents are the public representation of how the EU interacts with
non-member-states, and it is therefore an important place to explore
how the EU addresses key themes.

81

Chapter 4: Context of the European Union and Case Studies
This chapter presents the domestic and international contexts of
the European Union and case studies during the time period of this
project. One of the crucial elements of discursive analysis is that it
accepts “a dynamic relationship between text and the context in which
the text is produced”, and it “situates texts in their social, cultural,
political, and historical context” (Cheek 2004, 1144-1145). This
chapter is divided in three main parts: the context of the EU relative to
the rest of the world, the context of the EU internally, and the context
of the three case studies. The chapter concludes with the larger
significance of context for this project before proceeding to the next
chapter on data findings.

4.1

The European Union on the Global Stage
The years 2003 to 2011 were volatile around the world.

Terrorism was a major issue of concern in the West following the
attacks of September 11 especially, plus the Madrid bombings in 2004
and the London attacks in 2005. The decade culminated with the
sudden and momentous upheavals of the Arab Awakening in late 2010
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and 2011. From 2003 to 2011, the EU deferred sensitive defense and
security policy issues to the member-states. Members could act
through the Council of Ministers on behalf of state interests, or they
could act individually as independent countries. Therefore, security and
defense issues such as these were never part of the EU supranational
agenda and they were prone to internal differences. Indeed, the
controversy among EU members regarding the proper response to the
world’s most prominent security challenges suggests a deep reluctance
to cede foreign policy authority outside traditional state channels.
The US-led multilateral intervention in Afghanistan in 2001
became a policy priority for many member-states. Though most
member-states individually contributed troops to the International
Security Assistance Force through NATO, the EU’s primary involvement
in Afghanistan as an institution followed the fall of the Taliban and
consisted of political and economic assistance (Ross 2012, 109). The
EU assisted with reconstruction funds, humanitarian aid, social
services, and election support (109-110).
The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, however, was more
controversial for the EU and its constituent members. The EU’s primary
involvement in Iraq after 2003 was in a humanitarian capacity, such as
active involvement in the UN oil-for-food program (Toje 2008, 118119). The question of whether to support US use of force in Iraq was
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highly divisive for EU members. European opposition was led by
powerhouses France and Germany (Archick 2005, 6). Iraq exposed
disunity within the EU that culminated with rancor in the open press
between opponents and supporters of US use of force, the latter of
which included Great Britain and many of the new member-states
(124).
Though projecting security and military power is not a strong
suit of the EU, it has on some occasions asserted a collective security
role. In the 2000s, the EU sent peacekeeping, security, and border
missions to various locations such as Africa and the Balkans, albeit to
limited scales and intensities (Bickerton 2011, 4-5; Toje 2011, 51).
The EU as an organization did not participate beyond assistance and
humanitarian roles in many of the decade’s most prominent security
challenges, such as Kosovo and Darfur, and, as mentioned before, Iraq
and Afghanistan (Toje 2011, 51). Instead, individual EU memberstates acted independently through their respective foreign ministries.
Another major concern for the EU on the global stage was
relations with Russia, especially when it came to EU affairs in former
Soviet space. The EU had a “Russia first” policy at the time, in which
relations with Russia took precedence over the former Soviet republics
that comprised the Commonwealth of Independent States (Emerson et
al. 2005, 16). The fear that EU involvement in the region would
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undermine or offend relations with Russia was pronounced with
Ukraine especially, but also elsewhere in Russia’s backyard (Kuzio
2006, 95). Russia was also an alternative model to the stringent
requirements of Western democracy, especially in contrast to the
reforms required of the new member states in Central Europe. This
was implicit in Russia’s support for and endorsement of fraudulent and
flawed elections in the post-Soviet world, and explicit in its material
support for forces that undermined progress toward Western
standards.
Iran was another major—and sensitive—element of EU foreign
affairs during this time. Negotiations with Iran over illicit nuclear
activity were led by Germany, France, and the United Kingdom outside
EU channels, but the High Representative for the CFSP intermittently
joined talks on behalf of the Council of the EU (Bergenäs 2010, 491).
Among the most notable and relevant issues going on in the
world during this time frame were the democratic and economic
transitions of the former Soviet satellites. The EU was responding to a
great deal of geopolitical flux along its periphery following the collapse
of communism that began in 1989. That year, the EU was pressured to
respond to a new political era when communism collapsed in Central
Eastern Europe, as it became evident that many former Soviet
satellites would seek the West for security, growth, and stability.
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In anticipation of the accession of new members as well as the
reality of a post-Cold War era, the EU actively exercised carrot-andstick leverage in the Baltics, Central Europe, and even the Balkans. By
the late 1990s, it became evident that as many as ten former satellites
would fulfill the membership requirements, known as the Copenhagen
Criteria. These were states that had to face pervasive economic,
political, and social transitions prior to joining. Aptly called the ‘big
bang’, eight former communist countries officially joined the EU in
2004 and another two in 2007, resulting in the largest phase of
enlargement in EU history.

4.2

Within the European Union
In 2003, on the eve of the “big bang” enlargement, the EU

included 15 members; in 2004 it was 25, and by 2007 it was 27. The
years preceding and following enlargement—including all the years in
the scope of this study—required significant structural and procedural
changes within the EU itself. As Europe grappled with the impending
enlargement, EU members negotiated the Treaty of Nice in 2000 as an
institutional response to enlargement, including adjusting the size,
scope and voting structure of EU institutions (McCormick 2005, 74;
Cameron 2003, 24).
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New challenges became political obstacles as well, which would
not bode well for the color revolutions many years later. Among these
was the sociopolitical impact of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements.
Immigration policy in a region that lacks internal borders proved
especially controversial (Niblett 2005, 53): "Given the ease with which
migrants can move across borders within the EU once they have
gained entry, governments are being forced to respond to precipitate
rise in immigration.” These sociopolitical debates reflected crosscutting concerns of cheap labor and the possibility of new members
undermining the EU’s economic performance, competitiveness and
standards of living (43).
The failure of the proposed EU constitutional treaty in 2005 was
also a major turning point for the EU as an institution. Finalized in
2004, the proposal made sweeping institutional changes in response to
enlargement. However, the treaty required unanimous approval by all
25 members. Referenda on the matter were rejected by voters in
France and the Netherlands in 2005, effectively putting an end to the
proposed treaty. The negative reaction was seen as a response to the
effects of the 2004 enlargement round and as a "preemptive vote
against further EU enlargement, both to the east and, most of all,
toward Turkey" (Niblett 2005, 43).
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The aftermath of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements left little
appetite for further EU involvement in the post-Soviet world, especially
at the same scale as before. The implications of enlargement included
the practical worries of ordinary citizens, such as fears of job losses to
the proverbial Polish plumber. It also raised the question of the limits
of further and future expansion, an issue complicated by Turkey’s
candidacy looming in the background (Kuzio 2006, 91).
Survey data from the Eurobarometer demonstrate that
disagreement over future enlargement figured prominently during the
years of the color revolutions. By mid-2005, support for further
enlargement declined among EU citizens (EB 2005). Still, the internal
split at the subnational level regarding EU enlargement was most
prominent between the old member-states and the new memberstates—differences consistently spanned close to 25 to 30 percentage
points (EB 2005). Almost all of the new member-states topped the list
in levels of support while almost all of the founding members filled the
bottom in opposition.
Finally, monetary integration and the Euro figured prominently
during this time period. During membership negotiations, the new
members of the EU formally agreed to eventual adherence to the
requirements of the Euro (Johnson 2008, 827). Integration into the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), or the Eurozone, entails a set of
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stringent fiscal criteria. Of the new post-communist member-states,
only Slovenia (2007), Slovakia (2009), and Estonia (2011) have
achieved full integration and adoption of the Euro. According to the
European Commission, the EU requires the following for integration
into Eurozone: price stability, sound and sustainable public finances,
stable long-term interest rates, and fiscal exchange stability.
Overall, the enthusiasm for the Euro waned through the years of
this research, especially among the member-states who adopted the
Euro between 1999, when the Euro was introduced—Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (1999), and Greece (2001)—and
2004, when the new member-states joined the EU. The “open dissent
among older members over the benefits and viability of the euro zone”
was the greatest obstacle for EU decision-makers in the court of public
opinion and in the quest for interstate policy coordination (Johnson
2008, 836).

4.3

The Case Studies in Context

4.3.1 Context in Georgia
Located in the ethnically diverse southern Caucasus region,
Georgia is a post-Soviet republic of about four and half million people
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(Hoe-Yeong 2011, 7). Georgia gained independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991, and since then it has struggled to secure democratic
reforms amid ethnic, civil, and political unrest and conflict. Georgia’s
first leader following independence was Soviet-era Zviad
Gamsakhurdia, who was ousted in 1992. His opponents appointed
Soviet-era politician Eduard Shevardnadze. During the early years of
independence, tensions grew with separatist Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, generally considered to be supported by Russia. By 1995,
Abkhazia and South Ossetia became largely autonomous from
Georgian central control (8). Shevardnadze normalized otherwise
tense relations with Russia and matters improved with the breakaway
regions in Georgia, mostly due to Shevardnadze’s inability to exert
control over the separatist regions (Davis 2008, 472-473; Lynch 2006,
20).
Georgia’s rose revolution was triggered by contested
parliamentary elections in November 2003. Shevardnadze was
perceived to be corrupt and inept in the months leading up to the
parliamentary elections, and the state was failing in basic sectors
(Hoe-Yeong 2011, 8; Broers 2005, 334-335). Shevardnadze’s former
justice minister, Western-educated Mikhail Saakashvili, resigned and
formed his own party (Hoe-Yeong 2011, 8). Saakashvili’s party was
popular and poised to win the November 2003 parliamentary elections,
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but the results returned in favor of Shevardnadze’s party (8). The
outcome triggered a backlash and accusations of fraud; the mass
protests and calls for Shevardnadze’s resignation came to be known as
the rose revolution (8).
The rose revolution consisted of tens of thousands of protesters
in the streets, lasted twenty days, and was generally peaceful (Lynch
2006, 23; Broers 2005, 341). It was the first of the ‘color revolutions’
in the region, and it was soon followed by the orange revolution in
Ukraine and the tulip revolution in the Kyrgyz Republic in subsequent
years. Shevardnadze resigned, and Saakashvili won the presidential
election to replace him in January 2004 (Davis 2008, 474).
Though sometimes fraught with controversy, Georgia’s transition
reforms following the rose revolution were lauded by the international
community. Georgia was particularly successful in anti-corruption
reform, which was reflected in the drastic change in world rankings
following the rose revolution. For example, Transparency International,
the world index of perceptions on corruption, ranked Georgia 124th
place in 2003, and 67th place in 2008 (Kukhianidze 2009). The
reforms of the post-rose revolution government targeted the resources
of corrupt officials and a crackdown on criminal enterprises (228).
One of Saakashvili’s many objectives upon assuming office was
restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia relative to the separatist
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regions (Hoe-Yeong 2011, 8). Tensions mounted with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and by 2008 Georgia and Russia were at war over the
matter. Georgian and Russian accounts of the trigger for war differ on
key points, but an independent EU inquiry was conducted. Georgia
intervened militarily in separatist South Ossetia, but Russia also
intervened militarily on behalf of South Ossetia. Though the EU inquiry
deemed Georgia responsible for starting the war, it held Russia
ultimately culpable for its provocative military buildup ahead of the
conflict (Bowker 2011). The height of military conflict lasted less than
a week, but the effects and tensions lingered long thereafter.
Georgia’s tensions with Russia may stem partly from
Saakashvili’s unapologetic pro-Western policy. Saakashvili avidly
assumed a pro-NATO stance, much to the chagrin of its Russian
neighbor. He also pursued close cooperation with the EU, although
membership prospects always remained in the very distant future.
Over the years, the EU provided humanitarian assistance to Georgia,
as well as assistance with infrastructure rehabilitation in the postconflict zones (Hoe-Yeong 2011, 13; Lynch 2006, 64; Müller 2011,
66). Georgia plays a geo-strategic role for Europe as a transit corridor
for energy traveling from the Caspian across Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey to Europe (Hoe-Yeong 2011, 14).
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EU policy in Georgia has been based on the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1999, which created committees
within the EU to address relations with Georgia in the economic and
technical spheres primarily, but also some political dialogue toward
reform and stability (Lynch 2006, 59; Müller 2011, 66). PCAs are a
series of bilateral EU agreements covering cooperation in various
sectors such as trade and energy. EU cooperation with Georgia
deepened in similar sectors following the rose revolution (Müller 2011,
66).

4.3.2 Context in Ukraine
As the European Union responded to the important political
changes taking place in Georgia, Ukraine’s own politics began to
destabilize as well. The color revolutions were taking hold in the
region, and it appeared likely that the EU would have to respond to a
domino effect. Instability in Ukraine, however, was arguably more
disconcerting for the EU than anywhere else in its periphery. Of the
non-member post-communist states, Ukraine is likely the most
important geopolitically (Gawrich et al. 2010; Langbein and Wolczuk
2012).
When the Soviet Union collapsed and through the first
presidential election, Ukraine was led by its Soviet-era leader, Leonid
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Kravchuk. By 1994, Kravchuk lost the presidency to his former prime
minister, Leonid Kuchma, who would successfully introduce new and
broad presidential powers to the constitution (Hesli 2006, 168). Under
Kuchma, Ukraine was largely deemed by the international community
to be an authoritarian state. Kuchma won reelection in 1999, but not
without criticism for his illiberal tactics (169). By the time of the next
presidential election in 2004, popular sentiment against the
increasingly unpopular leader would culminate in the orange
revolution.
The political upheaval in Ukraine, like the others, began with
blatant election fraud in a regularly scheduled, yet far from free and
fair, runoff election. The runoff was between President Kuchma’s
handpicked candidate and current Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych,
and the leading opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko, himself a
former prime minister. Yanukovych leaned toward Russia in foreign
policy and stood against EU membership aspirations, while Yushchenko
vowed to look Westward (Hesli 20-6, 170). Despite Yushchenko’s clear
lead in the polls, Yanukovych won the runoff in an election widely
deemed by NGOs, IGOs, and citizens to be rigged. Approximately
200,000 Ukrainians peacefully demonstrated against the fraudulent
outcome across cities in Ukraine (175). Following the mass protests,
rerun elections were finally held in December 2004 and finalized in
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January, in which Yushchenko was triumphant. Thus, as can be argued
about the other color revolutions, Ukraine’s orange revolution was an
electoral revolution—that is, rigged elections successfully contested by
protesters (Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Kalandadze and Orenstein
2009).
The euphoria of the orange revolution quickly dissipated
domestically, with scandals plaguing the new government, and
externally, once it became clear that the orange revolution would be
insufficient to place Ukraine on the path to EU membership (Kubicek
2009, 324). The EU remained conspicuously mum about Ukrainian
membership as well (337).
In the EU, the debate surrounding how to respond to the orange
revolution quickly became couched in terms of enlargement,
particularly because Ukrainian leaders emphasized accession as a
priority. The notion of Ukrainian enlargement existed in the context of
the recent “big bang” of ten new members the year before, including
eight former Soviet satellites. In addition to the big bang, the
accession of Bulgaria and Romania was imminent, while talks of
Turkey and several other Balkan states like Croatia and Serbia were
looming in the background. The disagreement at the EU level was
indicative of strong popular cleavages brewing below.
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Regarding Ukraine, the divide manifested most starkly between
two groups. On one side were members who were more supportive of
Ukraine during this time; they included the new member-states plus
Britain and sometimes Germany. On the other side were members who
were much less amenable, including the western and southern major
European states, like France. Poland and Lithuania led efforts to
resolve the political crisis in Ukraine despite lacking official EU
representation (Kuzio 2006, 95). Indeed, records from the Lithuanian
foreign ministry show a commitment to Ukrainian integration as an
institutional advocate and active partner before and especially after
the orange revolution (Lithuania MFA 2004). Polish, along with German
and Lithuanian, efforts to expand ties with Ukraine beyond existing
frameworks encountered staunch resistance from members who
opposed expanding cooperation frameworks and unequivocally
opposed extending the possibility of membership (Stoltyk 2005).
The role of Russia figured prominently in the response to the
orange revolution. Qualitative survey data from the Institute for
European Politics, a German-based nonprofit organization dedicated to
the study of European integration, reveals significant variance in how
member-states of the EU viewed relations with Russia in the months
preceding the orange revolution. Not surprisingly, the newest EU
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members across Central Eastern Europe were the most critical of
relations with Russia (IEP 2004).
EU-Ukrainian relations extend back to the early 1990s, when the
EU was cultivating ties with most of the post-Soviet satellites and
republics shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Like Georgia,
Ukraine was never part of the Central and Eastern European bloc—
which ranges from Estonia to Hungary—to participate in various major
financial aid programs for infrastructure and development (Solonenko
2009, 713). Instead, it was grouped separately as part of the Newly
Independent States—a category that included Russia and the Central
Asian republics. Whereas eventual EU membership seemed promising
for the Central and Eastern European bloc, the same did not hold for
Ukraine (713). Unlike the experiences of the Central and Eastern
European countries, EU conditionality in Ukraine was weak, monitoring
was lax, and benchmarks were vague (717).
The first major agreement between the EU and Ukraine, the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, was signed in 1994 and went
into effect after EU member-state ratification in 1998. The next major
milestone for EU-Ukraine relations was the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP), which was an overarching framework for EU relations
with its neighbors in Eastern Europe and the Middle East North Africa
region. The ENP comprises a set of bilateral agreements known as
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Action Plans (AP). In these ways, the EU anticipated and acknowledged
the new borders it would inherit following the accession of the former
Soviet satellite states.
The tenets of the ENP regarding Ukraine were negotiated under
outgoing President Leonid Kuchma, widely regarded as complicit in the
corrupt and fraudulent runoff elections that would trigger the orange
revolution in 2005. The ENP was devised before any of the political
upheaval occurred. It was designed to address the post-enlargement
landscape, not to respond to democratization efforts central to the
color revolutions (Kuzio 2006, 90). Although the ENP had been a postenlargement response to Kuchma’s Ukraine, the ENP, in virtually the
same form, became the response to the orange revolution. In other
words, there was no strategically unique EU response to the dramatic
political turn of events; the EU response to the orange revolution was
essentially a failure to revamp existing policies in light of the
revolutions and to table the highly controversial issues which it
deliberately avoided in the ENP. The most notable among them was
the conspicuous absence of the possibility for membership. Ukraine
(and Georgia, for that matter) made no secret of its desire to join the
EU, and it has expressed interest in joining the EU off-and-on
throughout the years (Langbein and Wolczuk 2012, 868).
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The EU did make minor concessions in other sectors. The EU as
an institution was the top donor in aid to Ukraine the year following
the revolution (AidFlows, 2011). The EU granted Ukraine marketeconomy status within a year of the revolution, a move that paved the
way for Ukrainian accession to the World Trade Organization and for
upgraded economic ties between the two. It also eased visa
restrictions, something it did not do with Georgia, for example
(Larrabee 2006, 97; Tocci 2006, 77).
Besides extensive aid in the technical, nuclear safety, and
humanitarian sectors throughout the 1990s and 2000s (Kubicek 2005,
277-278), the EU had limited physical presence in Ukraine. Shortly
after the orange revolution, the EU established a delegation of advisors
on border security in late 2005. The group, known as the EU Border
Assistance Mission to Ukraine and Moldova, sought to mitigate
smuggling and trafficking, and to facilitate the orderly transfer of
goods, people, and trade through capacity-building, especially at a
time when the EU’s own borders expanded eastward after the 20042007 big bang (Dura 2009, 276; Kurowska and Tallis 2009, 53). The
Border Mission was managed by the European Commission with
intermittent input from member-states (Dura 2009, 278-279). The
Mission conducts its work—primarily technical in nature—by providing
training, limited oversight, and risk analysis along the Ukrainian99

Moldovan border, particularly in the conflicted Transnistrian region.
(280). EU program officials claim credit for facilitating a new customs
regime in the area, and contributing to major operations against illicit
border activities (282-283), though the extent of the local benefit is
debatable due to difficulties in measuring such successes (Kurowska
and Tallis 2009, 56-59).

4.3.3 Context in the Kyrgyz Republic
Like Georgia and Ukraine, the Kyrgyz Republic was a Soviet
Socialist Republic since the interwar period. Since the independence of
Kyrgyzstan and the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has been
considered exceptional in the region, as it is the only republic in
Central Asia to experience periods of competitive politics and
liberalization (Hiro 2009, 289; Huskey and Hill 2011, 876), and the
only republic in the region to undergo a ‘color revolution’.
Kyrgyzstan’s first president, Askar Akayev, assumed the
leadership role shortly before independence in 1990, and then was
popularly reelected after independence in 1991, 1995, and 2000.
Akayev was perceived to be a pro-democracy reformer, but by 2000 to
2005, he was accused of rampant corruption and clientelism (Aydıngün
and Aydıngün 2012, 2). After the 2005 parliamentary elections, the
people of Kyrgyzstan revolted in mass protest in what came to be
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known as the tulip revolution. Akayev was ousted, and Kurmanbek
Bakiyev took his place.
Bakiyev, who promised to deliver the democratic reforms
championed by the tulip revolution, was president from 2005 to 2010.
He not only failed to deliver on his promises, but instead moved
toward authoritarianism quickly upon assuming office, which only
added to the continued rampant corruption and clientelism (Aydıngün
and Aydıngün 2012, 2; Collins 2011, 153). Basic freedoms worsened
under Bakiyev relative to his predecessor (Collins 2011, 153). As
protests and clashes filled the streets, Bakiyev, too, was popularly
ousted in 2010. His place was assumed by Rosa Otunbayeva, who was
a pro-Western supporter of democratization and an active participant
of the tulip revolution (154), as interim president until December
2011. She oversaw a transition to free and fair elections, but also
oversaw major ethnic violence. One of the significant reforms of this
interim period was Kyrgyzstan’s shift from a presidential system to
parliamentary system, the first of its kind in the region.
Due in large part to Soviet ethnic engineering policies and
Soviet-era migration patterns, Kyrgyzstan is a multi-ethnic society.
Kyrgyzstan has a history of ethnic tension and violence, notably 1990
and 2010. The clashes were waged between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic
Uzbeks, primarily in the south of the country but also in the capital
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along the north. The clashes in 1990 happened during the Gorbachev
reforms, and they began as protests over land reform (Aydıngün and
Aydıngün 2012, 12). The clashes of 2010 occurred shortly after
Bakiyev fled the country and while Otunbayeva led the transition. The
son of ousted leader Bakiyev was accused of stirring ethnic mistrust
and instigating the 2010 violence amid a bleak economic atmosphere
(13).
Until the post-9/11 era, EU relations with Kyrgyzstan were
limited to economic and energy ties, but the focus on Afghanistan and
the Middle East renewed attention to Central Asia as a strategic region
(Hoffman 2010, 94). Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan would become
logistical hubs for the war in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan’s civilian airport
in the country’s capital served as the US military base and transit hub
for personnel bound to Afghanistan. Furthermore, Central Asia gained
strategic relevance as an alternative source of gas for Europe,
especially following energy shortages in 2009 (95). EU security
concerns in the region translated into EU-sponsored training and
material support for counternarcotic and counterterrorism programs
(Hoffman 2010, 100; Yazdani 2008, 251).
EU physical presence in Kyrgyzstan has been very limited as
well. The Council sent a Brussels-based Special Representative to the
Central Asian region, a position it established in July 2005. The
102

primary mission was to promote good relations with the region. The
Commission has a Central Asia delegation based in Kazakhstan, with a
small local office in Kyrgyzstan. The Commission also ramped up
human rights dialogue in the region in 2007 by establishing annual
meetings between Commission and Central Asian counterparts
regarding bilateral human rights and civil society.

4.4

Conclusion
Democratic discourse in this research must be understood

relative to its environment. The texts examined in this research
become constitutive of these larger events surrounding them
(Blommaert 2005, 39).
This chapter described the context of the EU relative to the
international community as one dominated by large-scale conflict, such
as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and relations with resurgent
world powers, like Russia. It also described the internal context of the
EU itself as one plagued by a “big bang” hangover, institutional
reforms, and member-state divisions. The three case studies—Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan—were all former Soviet republics
experiencing color revolutions, in which mass protests successfully
challenged fraudulent elections.
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Each context is replete with asymmetric power relations: the EU
as a normative power relative to members of the international
community as militarized powers, including its own members; within
the EU, larger and economically more robust states who have been
members for longer relative to smaller, weaker, and newer memberstates; and the EU relative to the non-member post-Soviet states in
question. Also, power asymmetries exist across the institutions of
focus, whereby one may have greater authority in foreign affairs than
another. These power asymmetries affect discourse when they restrict
or loosen the bounds of official textual discourse. For democratic
discourse, such power structures affect the hypothesized negative
relationship between institutional authority abroad and the level of
democratic discourse used.
This research does not measure the impact or effectiveness of
EU action or inaction in the target states, but the context does
illustrate the limited presence of the EU despite the dramatic political
changes occurring throughout the years under study.
The contexts of the three case studies in particular demonstrate
that Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic each are, for their own
reasons, of crucial importance to the EU. As such, one would expect a
well-defined, mature, and coherent foreign policy approach, reflective
of EU interests, to be a precondition for favorable future prospects of
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the EU. Because these interests are not always consistent across the
different institutions, this research will show that opinions on what
precisely constitutes EU interests vary among the Commission, the
Council, and the Parliament, which define foreign policy objectives
differently.
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Chapter 5: Constructing Democracy through Discourse
This chapter explores the data collected, coded, and analyzed
using Atlas.ti software. The chapter is divided into five parts. The first
three of the five parts present the data by EU institution (the unit of
analysis), starting with the Commission first, followed by the Council
and then the Parliament. Each institution will begin with the
institution’s role in the international affairs of the EU (see Figure 2),
followed by a description of the data and the discursive findings. These
sections are subdivided by case studies, and they identify patterns of
democratic discourse regarding Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz
Republic. The data is presented in that order based on the sequence in
which the color revolutions unfolded—first Georgia, then Ukraine, and
finally the Kyrgyz Republic. The fourth section of this chapter
summarizes the findings by case study, and the fifth section concludes
the chapter.
The data in this chapter will demonstrate that the three
institutions of the EU under study demonstrate distinct patterns of
democratic discourse. The Commission focuses on rule of law,
elections, and basic rights and freedoms. It is also most prone to react
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to political crises in the case studies. The Council focuses heavily on
critical elections as benchmarks of democracy; otherwise it tends
toward intangible qualities and democratic norms and ideals. The
Council has the most basic definition of democracy, most like that of
scholar Joseph Schumpeter (1942).

Commission
(The
Representative)

N=100

Council of
Ministers
(The DecisionMaker)

N=82

Parliament
(The Consultant)
N=48

•Supranational, represents the interests of the
EU as a whole
•EU's international representative; negotiates
international agreements (except for limited
policy areas of CFSP, which remains
intergovernmental)
•One Commissioner per member-state appointed
for five years
•Only institution that can propose draft
legislation, which then goes to the Council and
Parliament
•Intergovernmental, represents the interests of
the member-state
•Decision-makers, makes EU foreign policy
based on proposals by the Commission and in
consultation with the Parliament in policy
outside of CFSP
•For CFSP matters, retains primary authority
•Each member-state sends its foreign minister to
meetings on foreign affairs
•Appoints the High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy, who chairs the
Foreign Affairs Council and leads CFSP
•Subnational, represents the interests of the
citizens
•Must consent to legislation, approve Commission
appointments, and is the only body that can
dismiss the Commission
•Ministers popularly elected for five years

Figure 2: Roles of Institutions
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Finally, the Parliament is most critical of decisions made in the
countries and of fellow EU institutions. It constructs democracy in
holistic terms, meaning elements like elections and rule of law are
pieces of a larger conceptualization of democracy. Thus the Parliament
has the most comprehensive view of democracy, like that of scholars
Diamond and Morlino (2004) and Coppedge et al. (2011), whereby
democracy is a complex amalgamation of procedural and substantive
qualities. The Parliament’s construction of democracy is also a
reflection of its character as the only democratically elected institution
of the EU.

5.1

Discourse by the Commission
As the most supranational of EU institutions, it is the mandate of

the Commission to uphold the interests of the EU as a collective entity.
In foreign matters outside the scope of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), it has the authority to negotiate international
agreements on behalf of the EU, which are subsequently finalized by
the Council. Examples of policy areas outside the CFSP in which the
Commission is lead negotiator include humanitarian aid, trade,
development assistance, new member accession, and neighborhood
policy. The Commission exercises this authority through its
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directorate-generals (DG), or departments. The DGs most associated
with external affairs are the Directorate General for External Relations
and European Neighborhood Policy until 2009, and the DGs for trade,
humanitarian and foreign aid, development, and enlargement (Mix
2011, 17). The Commission is not lead negotiator for the limited policy
areas that fall under the CFSP—such as military missions, major
sanctions like those against Iran, weapons of mass destruction, and
the arms trade—which remain under the purview of state interests and
thus reside with the Council.
Because the Commission is like the EU foreign representative,
developments in the color revolutions were particularly salient and
relevant to this institution. The color revolutions were not part of the
CFSP, meaning the Commission had the greatest role relative to its
sister institutions in such matters. It responded to the dramatic
political events of Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz Republic via
official means collected as data in this research. The 100 pieces of
data for the Commission that address democracy explicitly in the
context of the case studies include Action Fiches (financing proposals
designed to facilitate decision-making), external memoranda,
institutional press releases, official speeches, meeting minutes, and
institutional reports, all of which were made public and released as
official institutional discourse. Of the Commission data, almost half of
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the data dealt with Ukraine, followed by Georgia and then the Kyrgyz
Republic. [See Figure 3]
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Figure 3: Commission Data Linking Democracy and Case Study

5.1.1 Commission Discourse on Georgia
The Commission data for Georgia included 34 documents which
addressed democracy explicitly. The data revealed an emphasis on
rule of law, institution building, and elections for the time period
between 2003 and 2011. Throughout those years, the rate of
democratic discourse—that is, the frequency with which the
Commission explicitly linked the term democracy with the case of
Georgia—spiked in 2008 most notably, followed by 2010 and 2004.
[See Figure 4]
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Figure 4: Commission Data on Georgia

The spike in democratic discourse by the Commission regarding
Georgia has to do in great part with the volatile political context of that
year. The year 2008 began with the aftermath of mass demonstrations
held by the public in November 2007, in which citizens rallied against
perceived corruption in the Saakashvili administration, culminating in a
state-of-emergency declared by the government (Tatum 2009, 153).
The protests were the largest since the rose revolution four years
earlier. In response, President Saakashvili held early presidential
elections, and, in January 2008, he was reelected by voters. In May of
that year, Georgia held early parliamentary elections as well. Finally,
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the brief war with Russia over secessionist Abkhazia and South Ossetia
peaked in August 2008, though tensions were brewing in the months
leading to that time. By September 2008, the economic effects of
conflict with Russia became evident—growth contracted significantly
from 12.7% the year before to 2.3% in 2008 (Müller 2011, 70).
The data also demonstrated a spike in democratic discourse in
2004, a crucial year for Georgia, since it immediately followed the rose
revolution of late 2003. Discourse by the Commission reflects the
cautious optimism of its day. One press release regarding President
Saakashvili’s first official visit to the Commission that year following
the rose revolution emphasized rule of law (COM 2004/997): “We have
confidence that President Saakashvili will show the political will to lead
the courageous Georgian people towards a bright and solid democratic
future, in which the rule of law and a free market economy replace
organized crime and corruption.”
The context in Georgia during the spike in 2010 was the passing
of major amendments to the constitution by the Georgian Parliament.
The constitutional changes diminished executive powers in favor of
parliamentary ones, and set Georgia on the path toward greater
parliamentary rule (Welt 2010). The reforms were controversial,
however, as opponents skeptically claimed ulterior motives by
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President Saakashvili, whom they viewed as posturing himself for the
role of prime minister after his presidency (Welt 2010).
In the case of Georgia, the Commission’s emphasis on rule of
law, institution building, and quality of elections—seemingly directed at
preserving order in a fragile democracy—were evident throughout the
time period under examination. Often, democracy was framed in terms
of paradoxical rules: the rules attempted to limit the government’s
power when it transcended certain undefined norms, but they also
expected the government to preserve order when confronted with
major challenges. For Georgia, it meant that the Commission expected
a balance between order and repression for the sake of stability. This
delicate balance was especially obvious in the late 2007 protests; the
protestors’ grievances against corruption; the subsequent government
crackdown; and the consequent early elections. This was a series of
events over the course of less than one year that challenged Georgia
to preserve order without gross violations of human rights.
In reference to the protests, an internal memo made the
following note (COM 2008/821): “Public administration reform is still at
an early stage. The lack of institutional stability and the continuous
changes and restructuring within the public administration are putting
at risks the sustainability of reforms and impact negatively on the
overall governance.” In this case, institutional capacity was an
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important precursor to good governance. Institutions as rules,
particularly democratic institutions, were highlighted by the
Commission. That year, they recognized basic democratic institutions
were in place, “but further efforts need to be made to ensure that a
democratic and human rights culture takes root in Georgian society”
(COM 2008/817).
Rule of law was a common theme that became pronounced
during and after the protests. Flagrant corruption was leading to mass
protests. This concern was echoed by the Commission, which praised
any small gain by Georgia in justice and against corruption: “Progress
has been achieved in justice sector reform, improving the business
climate and the fight against corruption” (COM 2011/915). The
Commission made the connection between rule of law and good
governance in a 2008 Action Fiche focusing on criminal justice reform,
in which it stated that “good governance” was necessary so that
Georgia may “comply with its international and national legal
obligations in the field of human rights” (COM 2008/816). In turn, the
document asserted, institutions would strengthen “in line with
democratic standards, which is the precondition for stability and
security in the country” (COM 2008/816).
For the Commission, elections in Georgia needed to be free and
fair. The motif was evident during elections years, especially in 2004
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(the first post-revolution presidential election). Several Commission
documents depict the emphasis on elections. In an Action Fiche from
2011, the Commission referred to a 2010 round of local elections,
calling it “an important test for the maturity of the functioning of
democratic institutions in the country” (COM 2011/959). It made a
similar reference in 2005 regarding the importance of “local selfgovernment” (COM 2004/997).
Several patterns in the discourse suggest the Commission’s
Western notion of proper elections. For one, the media would have to
play a role in the proper conduct of elections. The Commission called
the media a “fundamental freedom” in 2008 (COM 2008/1095) and
considered it critical for democratic consolidation (COM 2010/1102,
COM 2010/1222). In one press release in anticipation of the May 21,
2008, parliamentary elections, the Commission stated that, “The
successful organization of these elections will contribute to
strengthening the development of a democratic political system in
Georgia” (COM 2008/1051).
The piece of data that perhaps best sums up the Commission’s
perspective of democracy in Georgia is a 2011 strategic document that
took into account the tumultuous events of the preceding years. The
Commission described democracy in Georgia as having made
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significant gains toward democracy, but with noted need for
improvement in some areas (COM 2011/915, 5-6, 9):


Corruption: “Progress has been achieved in justice
sector reform, improving the business climate and the
fight against corruption.”



Political divisions: “In mid-2007, Georgia entered a
period of political turmoil, marked by anti-government
mass demonstrations and a polarized atmosphere
between the ruling majority and opposition parties.” And
“In April 2009, the political opposition in Georgia started
mass demonstrations, demanding the resignation of
President Saakashvili. This development, and the
criticisms made by the opposition parties, prompted the
Georgian government to push forward even further with
continuing democratic reforms, encouraging political
pluralism, amending the election code and ensuring
media freedom.”



Elections: “Early presidential and legislative elections in
2008 […] were reported to be in line with international
standards, by the OSCE/OIDHR, though the reports
outlined several irregularities in the conduct of both
elections. The opposition parties also criticized the ruling
116

majority regarding the conduct of elections and
contested the validity of the results. This resulted in the
decision of some opposition parties not to take up their
seats in Parliament.”


Civil Society: “To be able to consolidate the reforms and
assistance provided on good governance and in the
development of a modern state, oriented towards the
needs of its citizens, support for civil service reforms
requires special attention… for strengthening democratic
institutions and enhancing political pluralism, support for
human rights and media freedom should be further
encouraged. This point is supported by highlighting the
need for civil society development, encouraging the
systemic involvement of CSOs at all stages of
programming and implementation.”

The same 2011 document set forth “democratic development,
rule of law, good governance” as the Commission’s first priority in
Georgia. The related sub-priorities were (COM 2011/915): (1) media
freedom, political pluralism, human rights, civil society development;
(2) justice sector reform; and (3) public finance management and
public administration reform. The Commission claimed that these
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would lead to “greater acceptance of democratic values and lasting
results in democratization” and a “modern state oriented towards the
needs of its citizens and increased public confidence in the justice
system.”
Considering the peak of democratic discourse in 2008, one event
in Georgia was conspicuously missing in the Commission data: the
Commission devoted minimal attention to Georgia’s conflict with
Russia, which peaked that year. One compelling reason for this is that
the war itself falls within the scope of the CFSP, and thus resides with
the Council of the EU due to the military and security implications of
the issue. Still, in the 100-piece data linking democratic discourse by
the Commission to Georgia, the Commission only addressed the
conflict in terms of the stability and territorial integrity of Georgia and
the refusal to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The conflict was not framed in terms of
sovereignty from Russia, and the Commission only referred to the
conflict as a domestic issue relative to the separatist regions. This
perspective of the conflict was evident in two documents out of 100
(COM 2008/821, COM 2011/1235).

Overall, the democratic discourse by the Commission in Georgia
focused on rule of law, institution building, and elections. The
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Commission responded to major crises, valued stability and effective
institutions, and anticipated election cycles in Georgia. These elements
came together in late 2007 to 2008, when the Commission engaged in
democratic discourse the most.

5.1.2 Commission Discourse on Ukraine
Of the three case studies, Commission discourse was
consistently most fertile regarding to Ukraine. The database for this
study includes a set of 48 Commission documents in which democracy
and Ukraine are coded concurrently. Ukraine’s political transition may
have had a more immediate impact on the EU’s geopolitical and
strategic interests than that of the other case studies. Geopolitically,
Ukraine sits between Russia and Europe. The accession of the former
Soviet satellites would be of added significance to the geopolitical
dimension, as Ukraine’s orientation and policy preference for East
versus West became more pronounced. Issues such as rule of law and
procedural democracy would therefore have direct impact on the EU.
The Commission’s discourse in the case of Ukraine emphasized
elections, rule of law, and basic rights for the years of the study.
Throughout the years, the rate of democratic discourse spiked in 2010
and 2011 most notably. Figure 5 illustrates the frequency of
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Commission documents which explicitly referenced democracy in the
context of Ukraine in the dataset.
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Figure 5: Commission Data on Ukraine

The spike in democratic discourse reflects major political
setbacks in Ukraine during 2010 to 2011. Viktor Yanukovych, the
same candidate who was deemed to have rigged the 2004 elections
that sparked the orange revolution—won the presidency in a bitter
election against then-Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. It is also the
same year in which Yanukovych, after his victory, commenced criminal
proceedings against Tymoshenko; she was sentenced in 2011 to seven
years in prison for ostensible abuse of office.
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The data reveals a deep concern for political developments in
Ukraine following the 2010 victory of President Yanukovych and the
subsequent criminal case against Ms. Tymoshenko. Though the 2010
elections were generally described in satisfactory terms, almost all the
data for those years emphasize rule of law and human rights. In 2010,
shortly after Yanukovych assumed the presidency, the Commission
pointed out that it was “concerned at consistent and wide-spread
reports of deterioration in respect to fundamental freedoms and
democratic principles in Ukraine. Particularly worrying are complaints
related to freedom of the media, freedom of assembly and freedom of
association” (COM 2010/1227).
In one instance, the Commission was very direct about the
Tymoshenko case, asserting that “the procedural flaws in the on-going
trials of opposition representatives were symptomatic of politicallymotivated justice and acted to undermine democracy and the core
European values” (COM 2011/1119). Indeed, as with the other cases,
democratic values were often tied to the benchmark of European
standards (COM 2011/972): “increased knowledge of EU standards
and practices will raise democratic standards.”
The ENP Indicative for Ukraine, released in 2011, illustrates the
Commission’s concerns over Yanukovych in the larger context (COM
2011/916):
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Since the Orange Revolution of 2004, Ukraine has made
significant progress in deepening respect for democratic norms
and human rights: successive national elections have been
conducted largely in accordance with international standards;
civil society has taken root and flourished particularly in the
larger cities; there is a large degree of pluralism in the media
due partly to pluralism in media ownership. At the same time
the major political forces in Ukraine (including both the former
Orange Coalition leaders and the main opposition party) have
confirmed Ukraine’s European aspirations and its commitment to
a reform agenda. Nonetheless, reform efforts in particular as
regards implementation of laws and other normative acts have
been significantly undermined by political instability. Political
divisions within Ukraine’s leadership have in turn been
exacerbated by constitutional arrangements which lack clarity as
regards the division of powers and responsibilities. Consequently
in the past two years the pace of reform has slowed and at
certain significant periods of time some of the major institutions
of state have been virtually paralyzed […] Key reform priorities
remain: reform of the constitution itself; strengthening of
respect for the rule of law (notably through judicial reform),
redoubling of efforts to combat corruption and strengthening of
the business and investment climate. Ukraine’s leadership has
repeatedly confirmed the importance of continuing reform in all
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of these areas and consequently these priorities are reflected in
the new EU-Ukraine Association Agenda.

The document acknowledges gains made in previous years, but
admonishes strife among political leaders, and diminished progress
toward reform and rule of law.
Another notable element of discourse was the question of future
EU membership. Democratic discourse in Ukraine was coupled with the
(un)likelihood of membership. The EU Commission made a concerted
effort to preclude membership, albeit without completely eliminating
the possibility of future membership. The sentiment was persistent
throughout the years. In 2004, it stated that, though “membership is
not on the agenda”, the EU was “not closing any doors” (COM
2004/1201). In a 2005 speech, the Commissioner for External
Relations and the ENP stated (COM 2005/1202): “Ukraine has a great
deal of work to do to consolidate its democratic and economic
transitions, both of which are necessary before EU membership
becomes an option.” In minutes from a 2011 meeting, the Commission
made the link between democracy and membership again (COM
2011/777): “the importance of the EU having a clear position in its
relations with Ukraine taking account, on the one hand, of the need to
make the signature of the association agreement conditional on
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Ukraine’s respect for the principles of democracy and rule of law and,
on the other hand, of the support to be given to the country in order
to confirm and crystallize it’s rapprochement with the EU.”
The EU’s efforts to couple democratic progress with the
prospects of membership are closely tied to EU precedent in the new
member states of Central and Eastern Europe. In that case, the EU
was using soft conditionality, in which the (credible) commitment and
prospect of membership was the carrot and the threat of delayed or
terminated accession negotiations was the stick. However, in regions
further east like Ukraine where the distant prospect of membership
was not compelling or sufficiently credible, EU’s efforts to link
democratic progress to future membership have minimal practical
effects and remain in the discursive realm.

Overall, the democratic discourse by the Commission in Ukraine
emphasized elections, rule of law, and basic rights. The latter had to
do with the Commission’s critical response to the politics of
Yanukovych following his presidential victory in 2010 and subsequent
criminal case against political rival Tymoshenko. In the case of
Ukraine, the Commission also linked progress in democratic reform to
the prospects of future membership, a policy area in which the
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Commission is the primary driver. This linkage suggests weak
conditionality, or leverage, between the Commission and Ukraine.

5.1.3 Commission Discourse on the Kyrgyz Republic
Of the three case studies, discourse was least frequent in the
case of Kyrgyzstan. The database for this study includes a set of 21
Commission documents in which democracy and Kyrgyzstan were
coded simultaneously. The discourse emphasized very basic
democratic values and fundamental freedoms, especially as they
related to pluralism typical of democratic societies. The Commission
dedicated most of its limited democratic discourse to the years 2009
and 2010, which reflected a spike in the data. Figure 6 illustrates the
frequency of data which explicitly referenced democracy in the context
of Kyrgyzstan in the dataset.
The spread of data in the figure above is very telling about which
political developments were of significance to the Commission. For
years, Kyrgyzstan was under the Soviet-era leadership of President
Askar Akayev until the 2005 tulip revolution promised to bring about
democracy. From 2005 to 2010, the promises were never fulfilled by
Kyrgyzstan’s new President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. The Commission
made conspicuously little mention of the tulip revolution years until
Bakiyev’s suspect re-election in 2009. These years were crucial for the
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region, because Kyrgyzstan was the first and, since then, the only
country to popularly reject its Soviet-era president in 2005 in the
name of democratic revolution. Despite the historical importance of
those years, the dataset included only four Commission documents
from 2005 to 2008 with democratic discourse.
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Figure 6: Commission Data on Kyrgyzstan

It was not until 2009 and 2010 that the Commission paid notice.
In 2009, Bakiyev won re-election in presidential elections highly
criticized by onlookers. The elections were amid increasingly severe
antidemocratic moves by Bakiyev. In 2010 Kyrgyzstanis staged
another popular revolution, and Bakiyev was toppled by mass protests
in April. In a bid to limit the broad powers once enjoyed by Bakiyev
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under a presidential system, reformers established Kyrgyzstan as
Central Asia’s first and only parliamentary democracy. Thus the
Commission’s spread of data demonstrates that the promises of
democracy from the tulip revolution did not garner significant
democratic discourse until Bakiyev’s bold moves in 2009 and the new
revolution in 2010.
Though the 2009 re-election of Bakiyev was widely condemned
by the international community as unfair, the Commission did not
discuss the procedural elements of elections in the dataset for that
year. There were no references to the flawed re-election methods of
Bakiyev. Instead, the Commission looked toward freedoms of speech,
as they related to the media and civil society. The Commission called
the media a “‘watchdog’ for democracy and good governance” (COM
2009/872), and noted that civil society groups had “publicly
complained about a shrinking of democratic space that has weakened
their ability to make the different government levels accountable of
their actions” (COM 2009/870; COM 2009/875).
Finally, in 2010, the Commission made more direct commentary
on the state of democracy in the country, shortly before the fall of
Bakiyev. A 2010 Action Fiche sounded alarm over “a risk of a
worsening of the situation and a backtrack towards less democratic
environments” (COM 2010/941; COM 2010/942). The Commission
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responded to the 2010 revolution in the following memo (COM
2010/948): “The Provisional Government announced its resolve to
return the country to democratic principles and prepared, with the
support of the international community, including the EU and the
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, a new Constitution which
should create the region's first parliamentary democracy.”
In addition to the gaps in discourse regarding the initial
democratic promises of the tulip revolution, the Commission also did
not address the widespread and deadly violent conflict that erupted
across the country in May 2010 (just one month after the new
revolution) in any of the democratic discourse data. Democratic
discourse would have been very relevant, considering the severity of
the conflict—the interim leader declared a state of emergency amid the
violent and gruesome deaths of hundreds of victims, as well as the
displacement of many more. The basic security capabilities of the state
were under question, and other international observers placed blame
on the authorities themselves in perpetuating the violence against
ethnic minorities.

Overall, the democratic discourse by the Commission in
Kyrgyzstan emphasized basic democratic values and fundamental
freedoms considered typical of functioning democratic societies. The
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Commission devoted most of its democratic discourse to the severe
restrictions on freedoms of speech in the late Bakiyev years, shortly
before the new revolution of 2010. With the new revolution, the
Commission emphasized basic values, such as respect for human
rights and civil society. Conspicuously absent from democratic
discourse were the early democratic promises of the 2005 tulip
revolution and the deadly ethnic conflict of 2010.

5.2

Discourse by the Council
As the most intergovernmental of the EU institutions, it is the

Council’s job to uphold member-state interests. It is responsible for
consulting the Parliament and concluding foreign policy initiated by the
Commission. The Council achieves this by convening monthly the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs from each member-state. Before 2009,
these meetings were called the General Affairs and External Relations
Council; after 2009, it became the Foreign Affairs Council. As of 2009,
the latter meeting is chaired by the High Representative of the Union
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is then responsible for
coordinating policy among member-state interests and for
spearheading the Common Foreign and Security Policy, when
applicable in sensitive policy sectors of military and security.
129

The dataset for the Council included 82 documents that address
democracy explicitly for the case studies. The documents are press
releases, meeting minutes, and official speeches and statements. More
than half of the data dealt with Ukraine, followed by Georgia, and
significantly less for Kyrgyzstan (see Figure 7). The data on the
Council revealed an emphasis on critical elections, but also norms and
ideals, rather than concrete institutions or reforms.
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Figure 7: Council Data Linking Democracy and Case Study

5.2.1 Council Discourse on Georgia
The Council data on Georgia included 27 documents which
addressed democracy explicitly in the context of Georgia. The data
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emphasized elections especially and stability. The only spike in data
was in 2004, which was the time period immediately following the rose
revolution.
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Figure 8: Council Data on Georgia

For the Council, the conduct of elections was paramount, and the
secondary emphasis on stability was closely intertwined with elections.
Major elections were held in Georgia in 2003 (parliamentary, the
results of which were annulled during the rose revolution), 2004
(parliamentary and presidential), and 2008 (parliamentary and
presidential); local elections were held in 2006 (the first local elections
after the rose revolution) and 2010.
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As early as the 2003 elections, the Council “emphasized the
importance of stability in Georgia and in the region and urged all
parties concerned to respect the rule of law and to resort only to
peaceful and democratic means in seeking to resolve political
differences” (Council 2003/1287), but shortly afterward issued a
statement regarding election irregularities (Council 2003/2674): “The
European Union regrets these developments which weaken the trust of
the Georgian people in the authorities and are in contrast to the
evolution towards a democratic civil society.”
The rose revolution was a turning point for how the Council
perceived elections in Georgia. Following the dramatic political changes
of late 2003 and early 2004, the Council made several positive
comments regarding the 2004 elections, including: “closer to meeting
international standards for democratic elections” (Council 2004/2679);
“commendable progress...closer to meeting OSCE and Council of
Europe standards for democratic elections” (Council 2004/2683); and
“…the elections demonstrated commendable progress compared with
previous elections…” (Council 2004/2683).
The Council issued a press release regarding the 2008
presidential elections, which were held early in response to 2007
protests, stating (Council 2008/1444): “The Presidential Elections on 5
January 2008 were an important test for democracy and stability in
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Georgia […] consistent with most OSCE and Council of Europe
commitments and standards for democratic elections.” Regarding the
2008 parliamentary elections, also held early for the same reason, the
Council commented in a meeting, “…the situation in Georgia following
the parliamentary elections held on 21 May 2008…were an important
test for democracy” (Council 2008/1307).
When democratic discourse was not framed in terms of elections
and stability, the Council referred to democracy in very idealistic and
normative terms. The following statements stem from a 2008 meeting
(Council 2008/1397): “The EU side welcomed the recent commitments
of President Saakashvili for strengthening democratic institutions in
Georgia, and expected concrete steps in this sense. The Cooperation
Council agreed that consolidation of democracy was the key to
ensuring Georgia's long term stability and its successful transformation
into a prosperous, harmonious and united society.” Similarly, in 2011,
it issued a press release stating, “The EU supported the continuation of
democratic reforms in Georgia and the need to consolidate democratic
institutions, encourage political pluralism and enhance media freedom”
(Council 2011/2346).
The Council’s democratic discourse of Georgia was not evident
during the most provocative political crises of the time period, notably
the mass protests of late 2007 and the conflict with Russia. Though
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the Council did indeed confront the Russian-Georgia conflict from 2008
directly under the CFSP, it did so independently of democratic
discourse and outside the dataset for this research.

Overall, the Council emphasized elections primarily, but also
stability and democratic norms. The Council considered elections to be
barometers or tests of democracy for Georgia, and therefore placed
great value on the procedural elements of elections.

5.2.2 Council Discourse on Ukraine
The Council data on Ukraine included 47 documents with explicit
connections to democracy. The data also emphasized elections in this
case, as well as freedoms of the media. The data show one spike in
particular in 2004, where the Council demonstrated trepidation over
the elections that eventually sparked the orange revolution. After the
orange revolution in early 2005, the rate of democratic discourse
consistently declined with the exception of a small spike in 2010
(presidential elections). The pattern of decline in democratic discourse
suggests increased pessimism over the prospects of democracy in
Ukraine throughout the years.
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Figure 9: Council Data on Ukraine

The Council’s emphasis on elections was most dramatic in the
time immediately preceding the color revolution. The 2004 scheduled
election in question was between then-Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych and handpicked candidate of the outgoing less-thandemocratic leader, and the leading opposition candidate, Viktor
Yushchenko. The latter enjoyed a clear lead in the polls, but somehow
Yanukovych won the runoff election. The unfair election sparked mass
protests, which led to a rerun in December 2004 and the victory of
Yushchenko in early 2005. Thus, the frequency of democratic
discourse was undoubtedly highest during the presidential election of
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2004, and the most obvious patterns were frequent references to free
and fair elections, and electoral irregularities.
The Council was paying attention very closely and critically to
the two rounds of elections. One of the important elements of a free
and fair election process was the media. In response to the contested
first round, the Council expressed, “regret that the first round of the
elections had not met international standards. The EU had on several
occasions urged the Ukrainian authorities to observe democratic
principles and to redress the deficiencies, including by providing equal
access to the media for the two candidates, so that the second round
of elections could be free and fair” (Council 2004/1299; Council
2005/1343).
The Council was equally critical of the second round of that
presidential election, shortly before the orange revolution. Having
“followed the second round of elections with great concern... the EU
had on several occasions urged the Ukrainian authorities to observe
democratic principles so that the second round of elections could be
free and fair; that the second round of elections had clearly fallen
short of international standards and that in view of the irregularities
detailed in the OSCE/ ODIHR report the EU seriously questioned
whether the official results fully reflected the will of the Ukrainian
electorate” (Council 2004/1423). In fact, the Council perceived this as
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a crucial election (Council 2004/1716): “The aftermath of the second
round of the Ukrainian Presidential Elections has brought Ukraine to a
cross-road in her development towards establishing a fully-fledged
democratic society, and in the EU-Ukraine relationship.” Among the
complaints lodged by the Council against the second round of elections
were misconduct in the campaign period, reports of “widespread”
intimidation, ballot-stuffing, and violence, among others (Council
2004/1716).
After the orange revolution, the frequency of democratic
discourse in Ukraine diminished considerably. The Council returned to
issues of elections with the 2006 parliamentary round, which it
considered successful and indicative of democratic consolidation
(Council 2006/1436; Council 2006/1263): “that the elections, which
were considered free and fair, consolidated the democratic
breakthrough in Ukraine and should provide a strong basis for renewed
efforts to move forward in key reforms aimed at strengthening the rule
of law, transforming society and strengthening the market economy.”
It also called the 2007 parliamentary elections “witness to Ukraine's
progress in implementing its democratic reforms” (Council
2008/1247). Thus, for the Council, elections pave the way for
substantive democratic goals. Critical elections are even sufficiently a
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benchmark for democratic consolidation, an otherwise much too low
standard in the general scholarly community.
By 2010, as Yanukovych returned to the presidency and
launched a criminal case against his greatest rival, Yulia Tymoshenko,
the Council made references to human rights in four of seven
documents from 2010 to 2011. However, these references never made
an explicit connection between Yanukovych’s case against Tymoshenko
and the state of democracy in Ukraine. Instead, it used vague
language such as “respect for human rights” to state that such respect
is crucial for EU-Ukrainian relations. The Council did not make the
connection between the trial against Tymoshenko and the health of
Ukrainian democracy until 2011, the year Tymoshenko was sentenced
for alleged crimes; the Council noted “perceived deterioration of the
quality of democracy and rule of law in Ukraine,” but did not expound
any further.

Overall, the Council emphasized elections in its democratic
discourse of Ukraine, as well as the media as an enabler of proper
elections. There was an initial spike in democratic discourse shortly
before and after the orange revolution, but the frequency of such
discourse declined throughout the years. Conspicuously absent from
the discourse was an explicit connection between the widely publicized
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and criticized trial against Yulia Tymoshenko and democratic progress
or backsliding in Ukraine.

5.2.3 Council Discourse on The Kyrgyz Republic
The Council data on the Kyrgyz Republic included eight
documents which addressed democracy directly. Unlike the other
cases, the areas of focus in Kyrgyzstan were lofty democratic
principles, with minimal discussion on which reforms would produce
what effects. When the Council addressed elections in Kyrgyzstan, it
did so superficially and collectively as an outcome, not a procedure
with multiple potential points of failure.
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Figure 10: Council Data on Kyrgyzstan
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The few pieces of democratic discourse by the Council suggest
that—whether the period was the 2005 tulip revolution, the 2009
reelection of Bakiyev (the would-be reformer who was anything but),
or the new revolution of 2010 and the subsequent ethnic conflict—the
Council did not alter the frequency of democratic discourse. Instead, it
simply “welcomed” the reforms on the incoming 2010 coalition
government, for instance (Council 2010/2651).
In response to the events of the tulip revolution and the
promises of democratic grandeur, the Council made the following
comments (Council 2005/1726):
The Cooperation Council was the first meeting at this level
between the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic since the July 10
Presidential elections in the country. It called on the Kyrgyz
leadership to use this unique opportunity to fully embrace
democratic values, develop economic and social policies and
tackle wide-spread corruption, which are essential preconditions
for sustainable development of the country.
The EU welcomes and strongly supports close cooperation
between the Kyrgyz government and the OSCE. The EU is
willing to increase its political and economic cooperation with
the Kyrgyz Republic provided that the Kyrgyz government
demonstrates its commitment to reform, particularly in the
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areas of constitutional reform, democratization and improving
country's investment climate.

The comments above emphasize reforms at the leadership
level—socioeconomic policy and constitutional reform, for instance. Yet
a few years later, the Council shifted the burden of change from the
political elite to the citizenry. The Council placed the responsibility of
democratic reform with domestic actors, particularly civil society
(Council 2009/1260): “The task of sustaining a culture of human rights
and making democracy work for its citizens calls for the active
involvement of civil society. A developed and active civil society and
independent media are vital for the development of a pluralistic
society. The EU will cooperate with the Central Asia states to this end
and promote enhanced exchanges in civil society.”
Overall, the Council was supportive of democratization writ
large, but it did not identify specific policies or political turning points
that would either promote or hinder democracy. The Council
maintained a consistent rate of discourse despite periodic political
scandals otherwise related to democracy.
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5.3

Discourse by the Parliament
As the institution most representative of the public and EU

citizens, the Parliament is also the weakest in foreign affairs in terms
of authority in the founding treaties of the EU. The Council consults
with the Parliament on foreign affairs matters. This consultative
relationship can take shape in several forms. The Parliament may ask
the Council questions the latter must answer. The Parliament can also
make policy recommendations to the Council, which may or may not
be adopted. And, in issues areas outside the realm of CFSP, the
Council must secure the consent of the Parliament for its decisions.
Yet, only the Parliament can dismiss the Commission; while this has
never happened, the Parliament can exercise pressure over the
Commission in theory.
The Parliament had the least number of data in the set, totaling
48 documents. The data for the Parliament stem from minutes,
reports, resolutions, press releases, statements, and the meetings of
parliamentary subcommittees. Across the case studies, the Parliament
adopted the most comprehensive view of democracy. Rather than
emphasizing a particular facet of democracy, such as elections or rule
of law, it viewed those elements as constituent parts of an overarching
construct. For example, while elections may have been the defining
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benchmark for the Council, elections in and of themselves did not
define democratic success for the Parliament. The Parliament also
adopted the most long-range perspective for the practical value of
democratic reforms. Across the cases, the European Parliament
couched democratization as closely intertwined with its long-term
effects. Additionally, the Parliament was most directly critical of
domestic decision-makers in the case studies and of fellow EU
institutions.
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Figure 11: Parliamentary Data Linking Democracy and Case Study
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5.3.1 Parliament Discourse on Georgia
The parliamentary data on Georgia included 16 documents that
addressed democracy and Georgia concurrently. The data spiked in
2007, the year when Georgian citizens hit the streets en masse to
protest government corruption. Parliamentary discourse on Georgia
was holistic. It identified wide-ranging concerns, such as transparency,
judicial reform and independence, civil society, local-level governance,
and freedom of expression, among many others.
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Figure 12: Parliament Data on Georgia

The Parliament’s holistic view of democracy was set in the
context of long-term effects. In 2004, the Parliament warned Georgia
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that, despite applauding the conduct of the first major elections
following the rose revolution, democratic elections would only become
increasingly more challenging throughout the years as the system
became more competitive (EP 2004/2883). The Parliament was
optimistic of the rose revolution, though “Georgia still had to face a
number of issues, including improving the rule of law, reform of the
public service, economic reforms, and the reform of the judicial
system” (EP 2005/2886). In 2006, the year before the big protests of
2007, the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCC) on Georgia
noted numerous areas of concern (EP 2006/2893): “stresses the need
for Georgian government to focus on the continuation of the political
and economic reform process, strengthening the respect for the rule of
law, the independence of the judiciary, human rights, consolidating a
democratic system of government, the development of civil society,
media freedom, environmental protection, sustainable development
and poverty reduction.” The same document “call[ed] on the Council
and the Commission to take into account the views of the European
Parliament during the consultation process.”
The spike in data in 2007 revealed a similar pattern in which the
Parliament outlined a comprehensive critique of democracy spanning
numerous weaknesses. A report that year outlined the need to work
on government-opposition dialogue, rule of law, human rights,
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judiciary independence, and many other basic freedoms and features
of Western democracies (EP 2007/2856). Data from the minutes of a
PCC meeting included a parliamentarian who (EP 2007/2910):
“stressed that as part of the democratization process, there are
positive points mentioned by various NGOs such as the electoral
process, freedom of the media, local governance, and that they
certainly welcome the electoral process because it was deemed by the
international community to have taken place at European standards.
She also stressed the importance of being prudent in putting pressure
on all authorities, and she drew attention to “corruption, independence
of the judiciary and dialogue between government and the civil
society…” The final parliamentary recommendations from that same
PCC meeting included regard for local level democracy (EP
2007/2911): “deems that the reinforcement of local democracy and
self-governance is an effective instrument for the modernization of the
territorial administrative configuration of Georgia.”
The Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs mulled over a set
of proposed amendments in 2007 for EU policy. The document went
through a thorough count of both improvements and shortcomings in
democracy, and it proposed specific paragraphs to a policy proposal
under consideration by the Council (EP 2007/2861):
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Reiterates its continuing support for Georgia's efforts to
introduce political and economic reforms and to strengthen its
democratic institutions, thereby building a peaceful and
prosperous Georgia that can contribute to stability both in the
region and in the rest of Europe; expresses deep concern over
the recent developments in Georgia, which escalated into a
violent police crackdown on peaceful demonstrations, the
closing down of independent media outlets and the declaration
of the state of emergency; welcomes the decision by the
Georgian authorities to hold early presidential elections and a
referendum on the timing of parliamentary elections, in order to
restore the democratic conditions for free and fair elections and
the referendum; calls on the Georgian government, as a matter
of urgency, to: – respect the rule of law and restore media
freedom; – engage in a meaningful dialogue with the opposition
forces and with the public; – carry out a thorough, impartial and
independent investigation into the serious violations of human
rights and freedom of the media, and bring the cases concerned
to a fair trial;”
And—
Underlines the crucial importance of an independent and
effective judiciary as a central element of solid democracy;
encourages the countries of the South Caucasus to implement
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judiciary reforms in conformity with European standards;
supports the exchange of experience in this field.

Documents from the subsequent years continued to balance
praise with criticism across an array of democracy features. The
Parliament called for conditionality in 2010, stating that “EU assistance
should take place within the framework of political conditionality, such
as progress in political dialogue and reform and democratization
processes” (EP 2010/3012).

5.3.2 Parliament Discourse on Ukraine
The database included 26 pieces of data which explicitly linked
democracy and Ukraine. The frequency of discourse spiked in 2007. As
in Georgia, the Parliament maintained a holistic perspective of
Ukrainian democracy, in which elections were as important as freedom
of assembly and democratic institutions. The European Parliament was
also very direct in its criticism of democracy in Ukraine.
2007 was a year of political discord between coalition and
opposition factions in the Ukrainian parliament, which ultimately led to
the calling of early parliamentary elections in June 24 of that year. The
crisis stemmed from a conflict between President Yanukovych and the
Ukrainian Parliament which led to thousands of supporters gathering in
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support of each faction. Yanukovych dismissed the Parliament in April,
while the legality of his decision was contested in the courts. After
much quarreling, an agreement was made to hold early parliamentary
elections in June.
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Figure 13: Parliament Data on Ukraine

Of the three EU institutions, the Parliament had the greatest
discourse regarding Ukrainian parliamentary affairs. The European
Parliament addressed the 2007 crisis very directly and didactically: It
urged Ukraine to resolve the tensions between President and
Parliament “swiftly”, and to “further consolidate the footings of liberal
democracy” as it was “currently in a transition period…decisive for the
long-term stabilization of the country, for safeguarding of democracy,
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pluralism and the rule of law and for anchoring Ukraine in the
European democratic community” (EP 2007/2829).
The EU Parliament described progress in democracy as residing
in “a stable constitutional system, the protection of individual
freedoms, strengthening democratic control mechanisms and stable
anchoring of the rule of law” (EP 2007/2829). The institutional
tensions between the president and parliament of Ukraine, and the
subsequent demonstrations, were the context for the following press
release by the EU Parliament (EP 2007/2909): “Building a successful
and democratic future in Europe will require from Ukraine institutions
and rules that are strong, clear and legitimate and a political culture in
which all forces accept their share of responsibility…. Therefore,
without further delay the Ukrainian political and civic leaders should
agree on a comprehensive constitutional reform, aimed at improving
the system of checks and balances, clarifying the separation of powers
and reaffirming the supremacy of the rule of law… All these issues
should be addressed by the political players of the country without
involving the street action. The politicians must now concentrate on
agreements made and not on their disagreements.”
In the years that followed the crisis, the Parliament noted the
improvements and shortcomings of democracy in Ukraine. Elections
were considered important but they were by no means the sole
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benchmarks of democracy. A 2010 statement said, “The EP delegation
noted that the election process was carried out correctly but… any
functioning democracy also needs a wider, long term legal framework.
Accordingly to [a parliamentarian] ‘this election clearly showed that
Ukraine is consistently moving towards political stability and maturity.
The next step should be to restart the long postponed reforms of the
country for the benefit of Ukrainians” (EP 2010/2963). The Ministers of
the EU Parliament were “deeply concerned that media freedom and
independence have come under pressure in recent months and draw
attention to the disappearance of the editor-in-chief of a newspaper
that focuses on corruption. They also call for an investigation of the
Ukrainian USB Security Service, its politicization and possible
‘interference in the democratic process’" (EP 2010/2972).
The Parliament grew especially critical of Ukrainian democracy
by 2010. Whereas in 2007 it encouraged institutional and
constitutional reform, in 2010 it exhibited concerns of democratic
backsliding—that is, Ukraine was losing many of the democratic gains
it had accumulated in the preceding years. A 2010 resolution reflects
the Parliament’s holistic view of democracy in 2010 Ukraine (EP
2010/3014):
…allegations have been made that democratic freedoms, such
as freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of

151

the media, have come under pressure in recent months… the
establishment of a democratic, effective and durable system of
checks and balances should remain a priority and the process
for achieving this should be open, inclusive and accessible to all
political parties and actors in Ukraine… following the presidential
elections held in January 2010 there are increasingly worrying
signs of a lessening of respect for democracy and pluralism, as
evidenced, in particular, by the treatment of some NGOs and
individual complaints by journalists about pressure from their
editors or the owners of their media outlets to cover or not
cover certain events, as well as increased and politically
motivated activity by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) and
the misuse of administrative and judicial resources for political
purposes… [The Parliament] is concerned at recent
developments that could undermine media freedom and
pluralism; calls on the authorities to take all necessary
measures to protect these essential aspects of a democratic
society and to refrain from any attempt to control, directly or
indirectly, the content of reporting in the national media;
stresses the urgent need for a reform of the laws governing the
media sector […] Emphasizes the need to strengthen the
credibility, stability, independence and effectiveness of
institutions, thereby guaranteeing democracy and the rule of
law and promoting a consensual constitutional reform process
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based on the clear separation of powers and effective checks
and balances between state institutions […] Calls on all the
relevant political stakeholders, including the government and
opposition, to take part in this process…

Thus the EU Parliament focused on a wide range of democratic
elements in Ukraine—whether praise or criticism. It was most critical
about how the President and Ukrainian Parliament interacted in 2007,
citing separation of powers and political culture as the underlying
culprits (EP 2007/2909).

5.3.3 Parliament Discourse on The Kyrgyz Republic
The parliamentary data on Kyrgyzstan linking democracy and the
case study explicitly totaled only six documents, and they were spread
into 1-2 documents every other year. It viewed democracy in
Kyrgyzstan as extremely fragile, yet promising. The Parliament
explicitly referenced the EU Commission and the Council, who have
more authority than the Parliament, to support Kyrgyzstan in its
democratic endeavors.
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Figure 14: Parliament Data on Kyrgyzstan

In its 2005 document, the Parliament was very optimistic of the
tulip revolution and the potential that it could serve as a model for the
rest of the Central Asian states (EP 2005/2997): “[The Parliament]
intends firmly to support the current democratic transition in
Kyrgyzstan, the effective exercise of freedoms – especially
fundamental rights, freedom of expression, freedom to oppose the
regime and press freedom – and genuine, transparent elections;
Believes that a proper democratic process in Kyrgyzstan could provide
an excellent example for the other Central Asian countries; Calls on
the Kyrgyz Interim Government to steer a democratic course by
embarking on a policy of dialogue and national reconciliation, and to
maintain public order; Calls on the authorities of Kyrgyzstan to make
every effort to start a real process of democratization of the country
based on a genuine multi-party system and respect for human rights
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and the rule of law; welcomes, in this connection, the initiation of an
inclusive process of constitutional reform aimed at ensuring that the
previous system of power is fundamentally changed; Urges the
Commission to find ways to upgrade the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement with Kyrgyzstan and adjust it to the new situation, defining
democratic and economic benchmarks such as should lead to
enhanced relations.” A similar optimism was evident in a 2007
document from the Parliament, in which it noted that Kyrgyzstan had
“the potential to become an example for all the other Central Asia
states in the areas of democracy, human rights, and rule of law” (EP
2007/2832).
Despite its optimism, the Parliament was very critical of
democracy in Kyrgyzstan. A 2007 strategy paper highlighted
shortcomings in human rights, including the purported abuse of
women (EP 2007/2832), treatment of political prisoners, independence
of the media, and rule of law (EP 2007/2858). A 2008 document was
critical of the Central Asian region as whole, and in Kyrgyzstan it
specified the “fragile democratic institutions”, the need “to safeguard
the appropriate checks and balances,” and condemned “crackdowns”
on civil society (EP 2008/3005). Noting the failed promises of the tulip
revolution, the Parliament had the following to say about renewed
promises in 2010 (EP 2010/3010): “Points out that the Tulip
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Revolution of 2005 had created strong expectations of democratic
reforms in Kyrgyz society that did not materialize; calls on the Council
and the Commission to show coherence and assertiveness and to use
this opportunity to find ways to assist the provisional government of
Kyrgyzstan and help the authorities to pursue democratic reforms and
improve peoples’ lives through national development and the
empowerment of citizens in cooperation with all the stakeholders and
Kyrgyz civil society.”
The Parliament’s view of democracy in Kyrgyzstan was therefore
a heightened optimism for the potential it could serve as a model for
the region juxtaposed with a critical assessment of wide-ranging
shortcomings in democracy.

5.4

Democratic Discourse Summary by Case Study
In the case of Georgia, the Commission focused on rule of law,

institution building, and elections. The spike in 2008 revealed a
sensitivity regarding the late 2007 protests against corruption, the
government crackdown, early elections, and conflict with Russia—all in
the same time period. The Commission paid most attention to the
events of that year more than any other event by any of the
institutions. With Georgia, the Commission was most critical of the
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government’s ability to maintain order in politically palatable ways and
to maintain stability in the country. This overarching concern
surpassed the important of transition politics during the rose
revolution.
In the case of Georgia, the Council emphasized elections and
stability, as well as the norms and ideals deemed central to any
Western style democracy. The Council’s discourse on Georgia
demonstrated that critical elections were consistently the test and
benchmark for democracy in Georgia. Otherwise, discourse focused on
what norms Georgian democracy ought to aspire to attain. These
concerns surpassed concerns of human rights, corruption, and rule of
law. Finally, the Parliament adopted a holistic view of democracy
exemplified by a comprehensive critique of democratic gains and
shortcomings. The data spiked in 2007 more than it did in 2008,
meaning the popular unrest from 2007 received more attention than
the subsequent elections and conflict with Russia. [See Figure 15]
In the case of Ukraine, the case study with most attention of all,
the pattern exhibited by the Commission was an emphasis on
elections, rule of law, and basic rights. The spike in 2010-2011
demonstrated a basic human rights concern framed in terms of rule
law—the concern was that the criminal case against a major opposition
figure was politically motivated. The Commission also addressed
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Ukraine’s desire for future membership more often in this case than
did any other institution for any other case. The Commission’s
attention to the Yanukovych-Tymoshenko crisis surpassed the
democratic discourse it devoted to the orange revolution.
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Figure 15: Total Data for Georgia

In the case of Ukraine, the Council emphasized elections most of
all, but also the media, and Western norms of democracy. The spike in
democratic discourse at the time of the orange revolution
demonstrated its focus on the promises of the transition. After the
orange revolution, the Council never devoted as much democratic
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discourse to Ukraine again. Finally, the Parliament maintained a
holistic view of democracy in Ukraine. There was a noticeable spike in
democratic discourse in 2007, a year of significant discourse among
Ukraine’s legislators and between the president and the parliament.
The institutional crisis in Ukraine received more attention from the EU
Parliament than the orange revolution, the human rights crisis of
Tymoshenko’s imprisonment, or any election. [See Figure 16]
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Figure 16: Total Data for Ukraine

In the case of Kyrgyzstan, the case which garnered the least
democratic discourse by any institution, the institutions focused on
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basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Commission’s data
spiked in 2010, the year of the second revolution; the Commission
addressed democracy in Kyrgyzstan more than the other institutions.
The Council and the Parliament addressed Kyrgyzstan directly less
frequently, and they tended to discuss Central Asia as a region more
broadly than Kyrgyzstan as an individual state and context. [See
Figure 17]
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Figure 17: Total Data for Kyrgyzstan
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5.5

Conclusion
Each of the three major EU institutions demonstrated different

patterns of democratic discourse in the data (see Table 5). The
Commission demonstrated emphases of rule of law and elections, as
well as basic rights and freedoms. The Commission was most sensitive
to political crises, as it was the institution with the most discernible
spikes in each case study. The Council emphasized elections, and it
otherwise adopted discourse of lofty principles, norms, and ideals. The
Parliament adopted a more holistic perspective of democracy, one in
which elections and rule of law were but pieces of a larger democratic
puzzle. The Parliament was more critical of not only the actors and
institutions within the case studies, but also of its peer European
institutions.
Table 5: Patterns of Discourse
Commission

Council

Parliament

Georgia
Rule of Law,
Institution
Building,
Elections
Elections,
Stability,
Norms
Holistic and
Accountability

Ukraine
Elections, Rule
of Law, Basic
Rights
Elections,
Media
Holistic and
Accountability

Kyrgyzstan
Basic Values
and
Fundamental
Freedoms
Norms

Overall
Rule of Law,
Elections

Holistic and
Accountability

Holistic and
Accountability

Elections,
Norms

The patterns identified in the table above will be discussed
further in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6: Explaining Convergence and Divergence
The data in the previous chapter reveal patterns that suggest
the European Union’s role as a cohesive global actor is challenged by
its own institutional dynamics. This chapter explores the explanation
for the varying patterns between institutions.

6.1

Constructing Democracy through Discourse
The Commission tended to emphasize rule of law and elections

in its construction of democracy. The Commission described
democracy in procedural terms that valued stability and order.
Elections were the venue for these values, but rule of law was the
critical enabling factor for democracy.
The Council emphasized elections above all else, while it adopted
discourse of lofty principles, norms, and ideals in between. It
constructed democracy in minimalist and procedural terms that
distinctly valued critical elections as tests of democracy.
Finally, the Parliament adopted a holistic perspective of
democracy, and it did so very critically of decision-makers both within
the target country and within the EU. Elections and rule of law were
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not independently paramount but rather elements of a larger
construction that included everything from substantive elements to
procedural factors.
The three constructions of democracy therefore reveal different
ways each institution judged democracy—different priorities and
concerns. All three institutions valued the procedural facet of
democracy, including elections, rule of law, and institutional
accountability. However, the three institutions varied in the extent of
the substantive sphere of democracy, like civil and political freedoms.

6.2

Explaining Convergence and Divergence
This research proposes that the following may explain the

institutional dynamics observed in this research: the institutions of the
EU have different stakes in foreign policy commitments and outcomes.
Institutions with greater authority to act in foreign affairs, based on
the powers granted to them in EU treaties, perceive greater stakes in
decision-making. Institutional authority means an institution has the
ability to demand and enforce (such as conditionality). If an institution
enjoys such authority, it can exercise it either formally through public
conditions or pre-conditions, or informally through recommendations
and pressure rather than explicit prerequisites. Institutional stakes are
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the vested interests of institutions regarding outcomes based on
tangible losses for that particular institution.
This research hypothesized a negative relationship between
institutional authority abroad and levels of democratic discourse. That
is, the least powerful institutional actor of the EU, the Parliament,
would have been most likely to use democratic discourse in reference
to the non-member-states, because the limited impact of its
discourse—due to lack of incentives and disincentives—allowed it to
make bolder statements. The inverse was expected to hold as well,
since greater institutional authority abroad leads to greater
responsibility and accountability. If an institution has less authority in
foreign affairs, then it faces fewer repercussions when using
democratic discourse, as it will likely not be held accountable for the
fulfillment of such norms in EU relationships with target states. These
dynamics were observed in the democratic discourse, which were the
outcomes that captured EU institutional dynamics in EU policy.
The reason why institutions with greater authority in foreign
affairs perceive greater stakes relates to two measures, based on
Levitsky and Way (2005), of perceived loss proposed earlier in the
research. The first measure is whether there were competing issues on
the institutional agenda. The second measure is the degree of
economic, geopolitical, and social linkages to the case study.
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Throughout the discourse, a competing interest for the Commission
was the prospect of membership for the case study. This explains why
the Commission was extremely cautious to link democratic reform to
the possibility of membership in Ukraine most of all. The discourse also
demonstrated a competing interest of stability along the periphery.
The Council, on the other hand, had competing interests at the
national level. This was most evident in the limited CFSP policy areas,
though most of the discourse fell outside the CFSP. The discourse by
the Council demonstrated a “lowest-denominator” pattern which
suggests that it allowed for such competing interests to be channeled
at the national level, independent from the EU. The Parliament,
however, did not have the authority to lead foreign policy, but it did
have an interest in accruing greater institutional authority relative to
the other institutions. This institutional stake was evident in the
Parliament’s intermittent calls for the Commission and the Council to
pursue a particular type of policy or approach in the target country,
such as conditionality.
The second measure of perceived loss, or stakes, was the
linkage between the EU and the case study. This measure helps
explain why discourse was highest across the institutions for Ukraine,
second highest for Georgia, and lowest for Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan had
the lowest linkages relative to the other case studies: it is far more
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dependent economically, geopolitically, and socially to Russia than the
West. Despite Georgia’s yearning for deeper linkages with the West,
the perceived loss of ties to Ukraine was more geopolitically
consequential than Georgia, and as such may have prompted greater
discourse.

Commission
(Supranational)

Council
(National)

Parliament
(Subnational)

•
•
•
•
•

Most Authority Abroad
Occasionally critical
Emphasis on two elements of democracy
Middle rate of democratic discourse
Negative relationship between authority and discourse

•
•
•
•
•

Select Authority Abroad
Least critical
Heavy emphasis on one element of democracy
Lowest rate of democratic discourse
Negative relationship between authority and discourse

•
•
•
•
•

Least Authority Abroad
Most critical
Most holistic construction of democracy
Highest rate of democratic discourse
Negative relationship between authority and discourse

Figure 18: Institutional Authority and Democratic Discourse

Figure 18 demonstrates how institutional authority relates to the
democratic discourse, based on the data. In the figure, I propose five
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categories to illustrate the analysis. First is the level of institutional
authority, which is the ability to demand and enforce. This was
determined according to the role the institutions played in the foreign
affairs of the case studies. The Commission had the greatest authority,
because it was the EU’s lead negotiator and foreign representative on
all but the most sensitive security issues. The Council had much less
breadth of authority in foreign affairs, except for very limited security
policy issues falling under the CFSP. The CFSP has been reserved for
the discretion of interstate deliberation through the Council because of
the sensitive nature of defense and security. Due to the limited scope
of the CFSP in this study, the Council was weaker than the
Commission in general foreign affairs.
The second indicator is how critical the institution was of
democracy in the case studies, qualitatively. This reflects the extent to
which the institution discussed the scope of challenges facing the case
studies in overall democratic processes when compared to the other
EU institutions. The third element summarizes the general pattern of
democratic discourse based on the conclusions from chapter 5. The
fourth factor is the rate of democratic discourse. This is the frequency
of codes that link “democracy” and the case study explicitly in the
coded dataset relative to the raw dataset. The last indicator is a direct
response to the hypothesized relationship between institutional
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authority and rate of discourse. The assessment is whether a negative
or positive relationship exists.
In each institution, there was a negative relationship between
that particular institution’s authority in matters of foreign affairs and in
the level of democratic discourse it employed throughout the case
studies. The institution with the least power abroad used the highest
rate of democratic discourse. The reason for this consistency was the
weight and gravity of democratic discourse—the more powerful
institutions were more likely to be held accountable for discourse and
thus had a greater stake in it.
The Commission was the institution with the greatest ability to
exercise authority, relative to the other EU institutions, in its relations
with the case studies. The primary way it could do this was through
conditionality. Conditionality is the "exercise of policy instruments by
one party to secure compliance and shape the actions of another
party,” and it can be formal or informal. The former can be identified
when conditions or pre-conditions are publicly stated, whereas the
latter manifests through recommendations or pressure rather than
explicit prerequisites. In democratic discourse, the Commission utilized
conditionality only informally. That is, the Commission did not
establish explicit pre-conditions of democratic reform in exchange for
incentives, as it did with so many former Soviet satellites seeking
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accession. Instead, it expressed the standards of rule of law, elections,
and stability. The rewards for progress in those sectors—in other
words, conditionality—were implicit in the potential access to funds,
resources, and markets.
The Council of the EU had select authority in foreign matters,
restricted only to “high-level politics” of sensitive defense and security
issues. To provide a sample of the kinds of policy reserved for the
Council under the CFSP, matters such as sanctions, terrorism,
proliferation, and arms trade, and places like Iran, Syria, Libya,
Afghanistan and Iraq, Somalia, and Sudan were most common during
the time period of this study.
The Council exercised its authority under CFSP in the case
studies in the following occasions. It dealt with Georgia in the
aftermath of the 2008 South Ossetia War, when it sent an EU
Monitoring Mission to serve as peace monitors and observers in the
conflict zones. There was no explicit democratic discourse in those
documents, which were therefore not part of the dataset of this study.
It also dealt with Georgia by sending a Brussels-based “Special
Representative.” The Special Representative’s mission was to ensure
stability and to monitor the conflict areas. At no point was there
explicit democratic discourse in the context of the Special
Representative to Georgia. The third and final instance of CFSP activity
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in Georgia was an early rule of law mission, sent in 2004 under the
CFSP’s predecessor (the Common Foreign and Defense Policy) for one
year to support and advise Georgian decision-makers. The sole
reference to democracy was a brief description of another separate
document, already included in the dataset for this research.
The CFSP was invoked only one time in Ukraine in 2005, when
the Council supported Ukraine financially in its efforts to combat the
accumulation of small arms and light weapons. It never invoked
democratic discourse in that case. The Council dealt with Kyrgyzstan
under the CFSP on one occasion, also sending a Special
Representative. The Special Representative was assigned to the
Central Asian region and based in Brussels. The primary mission was
to promote good relations with the region, contribute to stability,
address key threats, and “contribute to strengthening democracy, rule
of law, good governance and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Central Asia,” which was the sole reference
to democracy. The CFSP documents on the Special Representative
were very technical, covering aspects such as financing of the position,
composition of the staff, in-country privileges and immunities, and the
team’s security. Otherwise, there was no discourse of democracy or of
related substantive issues.
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The Council did indeed enjoy power in narrow but significant
policy areas, and it exercised authority in the case studies during the
aforementioned instances. However, it had the lowest rate of
democratic discourse relative to the other institutions and heavily
emphasized elections when it did discuss democracy. Because the
Council represents the interests of member-states, rather than the EU
as a whole, the Council likely moderated its democratic discourse due
to shared values of sovereignty. In other words, it does not behoove
states—especially member-states with fragile democracies of their
own—to be highly critical of neighboring states. Furthermore,
individual member-states were not confined to the EU sphere and
could still act independently through the foreign ministries of their own
states. This allowed them to circumvent institutional chokepoints
within the EU.
The Parliament was the least powerful in the foreign affairs
arena, relative to the other institutions, yet it demonstrated high rates
of democratic discourse. The Parliament does not have any authority
in the CFSP, but it does retain some powers in other foreign policy
areas. The Parliament must agree with the Council on decisions
proposed by the Commission, or else they need to amend the proposal
until an agreement is reached. In the scope of this research, this
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process in the foreign affairs arena never failed to reach consensus,
and amendments to such proposals were included in the dataset.
Though the Parliament did not have the power to leverage
conditionality or to send special envoys, it was still very critical of
democracy in the three case studies and of its fellow institutions. The
Parliament does not represent the interests of the EU as a whole or the
interests of the states; instead it represents the collective interests of
EU citizens, who may share similar concerns of democracy in their own
home states. The Parliament may have been exerting itself through
discourse despite limited authority in an effort to demand greater
powers in the future. This is consistent with the Parliament’s
incremental growth of powers throughout the years.

6.3

Conclusion
The data from the previous chapter demonstrated that patterns

of democratic discourse existed in the three institutions of the EU. This
chapter argued that each institution had stakes in foreign
commitments and outcomes. The greater the stake, the less
democratic discourse was used, indicating a negative relationship
between institutional authority abroad and levels of democratic
discourse. The institution would face repercussions commensurate with
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its foreign powers when using democratic discourse, because it could
be held accountable for such discourse. The next chapter will conclude
with the implications of this research.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications
7.1

Concluding Comments
Since the Treaty of the European Union in 1993, the EU has

embraced institutional reforms with the stated purpose of greater unity
and cohesion abroad. The prospects have been dim, as the EU has
struggled to project itself as a unitary actor in foreign matters. The
political and economic transitions of Central and Eastern Europe
following the collapse of communism provided it with an opportunity to
assume a leading role across a wide range of reforms. Indeed, in
matters of democracy, the EU seems to have maintained a consistent
and common position.
The color revolutions that began with Georgia in 2003, spread to
Ukraine in 2004, and reached Kyrgyzstan in 2005 could have been
another opportunity for the EU to exert itself as a unitary actor in
former Soviet space. At the time, the EU was still reeling from the
recent decision to accept ten former Soviet satellites. Despite a
consistent commitment to democracy in the former Soviet states, even
if in rhetoric only, the EU struggled to remain the strong regional actor
it was reputed to be elsewhere in Central Eastern Europe.
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This research asked whether the institutions of the EU promote
or hinder the EU’s ability to act as a global unitary actor. It selected an
issue area in which the EU would be “most likely”, based on precedent,
to display a common position: democratic discourse. It chose case
studies that did not have immediate prospects of membership and
were located in former Soviet space during a time “most likely” to be
receptive to democratic discourse: Georgia, Ukraine, and the Kyrgyz
Republic, all from 2003 to 2011. It used official institutional documents
from the European Commission, the Council of the EU, and the
European Parliament to identify patterns of discourse in the
construction of democracy.
The analysis demonstrated that, across the institutions,
democratic discourse was only consistent in the minimal procedural
requirements, such as elections and rule of law, but the institutions
diverged considerably in the extent to which democratic reform could
be judged as such. It argued that a reason for these differences was a
negative relationship between institutional authority in foreign policy
making and rate of democratic discourse.
The findings indicate that the limits of the EU as a unitary actor
are not to be found only in national-level divergences. Instead, the EU
as a whole and its institutions represent competing interests, as well,
which present potential challenges to unitary policy abroad.
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The lack of institutional cohesiveness in normative affairs points
to the limits of EU institutional consolidation. Nevertheless, this
characteristic may actually serve as a safety valve for the EU by
allowing competing interests to exist within the same organization.
This safety valve is also a form of burden sharing within the EU. When
consensus is a requirement, such as the limited sensitive policy areas
of the CFSP, the EU is much more vulnerable to undermining divisions.
This stems from the voting structure in CFSP versus non-CFSP policies:
the policy process of the former requires unanimity among all
member-states in most cases, while the latter requires a qualified
majority.
When consensus is not a requirement, ambiguity can be
beneficial to balance realpolitik with normative pressures. It also
provides windows of opportunity for interest and identity formation.
The Parliament highlights this dynamic well, because it is able to
pursue greater institutional power throughout the years, essentially
challenging the EU hierarchy itself. Challenges to the structure and
hierarchy in EU foreign affairs can redistribute power among the
institutions and thus shape future patterns of integration.
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7.2

Implications for Defining Democracy
Though the European Union as a whole does not have an official

definition of democracy, this research indicates that each of the three
institutions conceptualize and embrace different definitions of
democracy. Overall, the Commission, or the supranational
representative, had the “middle of the road” approach; the Council, or
the intergovernmental decision-maker, had the most minimalist
approach; and the Parliament, or the subnational consultant, was the
most critical of all. From their discourse, the following definitions can
be deduced.
The Commission emphasized rule of law and elections, and it
constructed democracy as a procedural phenomenon. Democracy for
the Commission is a stable system with regular elections, and without
gross violations of political, civil, and human rights. This is a mostly
procedural definition, although the Commission does have an unstated
threshold for substantive dimensions of democracy, most evident in
discursive spikes during political crises. For democracy theory, the
Commission’s preference for stability is reminiscent of Huntingtonian
political order (Huntington 1968), which posed the controversial
argument that political order was a necessary precondition of
democracy. As the institution entrusted to guard EU supranational
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interests, this conceptualization of democracy indicates a concern for
stability along the neighboring corridors of the EU.
The Council emphasized critical elections heavily. Democracy for
the Council is a system with successful elections—as measured by
third party NGOs. This reflects a minimalist definition of democracy
similar to traditional democracy theory. Schumpeter (1942) argued
that democracy ensures minimal procedures and structures are in
place for elite competition, and voters choose among the competing
elites. Adam Przeworski (1999, 23), who views democracy as simply a
system in which rulers are elected, argues that additional criteria
beyond minimalist definitions—while important for the quality of
democracy and its prospects for survival—are not necessary for the
basic definition itself (50). The Council’s tendency to characterize
democracy in basic minimalist terms reflects the intergovernmental
nature of the institution. The Council comprises so many different
members with very distinct political pasts—Western liberal societies,
fascism, communism, and the various domestic political crises in
between—that a “common denominator” definition of democracy may
be the best one it can invoke.
The Parliament constructed democracy with substantive and
procedural standards higher than the other institutions. This suggests
the Parliament defines democracy as a complex web of indicators. The
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Parliament’s view of democracy is most similar to the post-1980s trend
in the democracy literature, which was influenced by the transitions of
southern Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. The
democratization theorists who looked at democracy as multifaceted in
nature were critical of minimalist definitions. Furthermore, the
Parliament’s view of democracy is careful not to assume any reform is
necessarily democratic. This perspective is like Levitsky and Way
(2002), who argued that some transitions can lead to hybrid
nondemocratic regimes. As the institution most representative of
European citizens, this conceptualization of democracy may be
indicative of popular perspectives regarding their own national
democracies.
Nevertheless, the lack of an explicit definition of democracy in
the EU may actually behoove the organization. It may reflect a
concern over whether EU members themselves can meet democratic
criteria, as many of them are fraught with scandals of their own. The
ambiguity in the definition affords EU members some protection from
being criticized over democracy domestically. In addition to memberstates, the EU itself has also been subject to criticism for its lack of
democratic credentials: only the Parliament is democratically elected,
and the other institutions lack transparency in their decision-making
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processes. Therefore, the lack of a definition also provides the EU itself
some protection from similar criticism.
On the other hand, if democracy is defined too minimally, nonmember-states could claim democracy prematurely, especially in
places where membership is geographically possible. Such ambiguity
in the definition allows for discretion over who to deem as democratic
or not, especially when democracy is considered the most vital
requirement for potential membership.
Though ambiguity is beneficial by balancing the pressures of
pragmatism versus idealism, it also undermines the EU’s ability to
adopt a clear stance on basic human rights and political crises in many
cases. The lack of a definition or common understanding of what
democracy should mean leads the EU to adopt inconsistent rhetoric
and action. In some instances of human rights violations or gross
political setbacks, the EU’s failure to embrace a consistent
interpretation of democracy tarnishes its image as a normative actor in
the world.

7.3

International Relations and Integration Revisited
The implications of this research also contribute to theoretical

discussions in international relations regarding the value of
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international institutions. It moved away from the neorealist
assumption that states are inherently in conflict and thus cannot
achieve meaningful cooperation through institutions unless it is to
ensure survival and security. Based on the EU’s experiences in Central
and Eastern European reforms, the views inherent in regime theory
were a useful premise instead. Regime theory argues that international
regimes allow interdependent states to pursue objectives they could
not realize on their own through policy coordination (Keohane 1984,
97).
Nevertheless, there are limits to a liberal institutionalist
understanding of the EU due to the inter-institutional discord evident
in discourse. These limits are best understood by the constructivist
lens, because the interests of institutions and the interests of
individual agency (whether the member-state or actors within the
institution itself) comingle to produce a complex web of competing
interests. While this may be a prominent feature of bureaucratic
politics in general, it becomes a problem in practice when the EU tries
to assert itself as a unitary actor and as it tries to promote democracy
as a precondition for membership.
Another limit of liberal institutionalism best captured by
constructivism is the assumption in the former that the primary role of
institutions is as facilitator between states (Hyde Pierce 2004, 104). As
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this research shows and constructivism supports, institutions
themselves are essential to the process of interest- and identityformation (104). This was apparent when parliamentarians called for
the Commission to utilize conditionality mechanisms in Georgia, for
example. This was an instance of one institution seeking to shape
shared interests with another institution through discourse. Another
example is the Parliament’s gradually increasing role in foreign affairs,
as evident in its growing power through treaties. This demonstrates
that the Parliament, as an institution, is able to articulate its own
interests independent of the traditional state.
This research therefore contributes to the constructivist school of
thought, in which discourse, ideas, and norms shape international
relations. By looking for inter-institutional dynamics through discourse,
this study demonstrated that different contexts demonstrated different
levels of discourse. For example, the Commission’s sensitivity to
political crises and the Council’s sensitivity to elections generated
different constructions of democratic norms. Such findings support the
constructivist argument that changing contexts affect how norms are
constituted.
By considering the authority of each institution to enforce norms,
this research also contributes to constructivist arguments that assign
agency to actors beyond the traditional state. For example, the
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Commission is a supranational actor and institution, whose power of
norms and discourse could be independent from the traditional state
unit. While constituent member-states can still enjoy power through
discourse, the Commission was the representative of the EU with the
greatest ability to inject discourse in international negotiations and
agreements.
Despite any apparent inefficiencies or trouble conjuring up
unitary actorhood in the EU, the history of EU institutional integration
suggests that a possible theoretical explanation for inter-institutional
divergences may be a lag in institutional development. In this case, a
lag or gap exists between formal institutional design—such as those
aimed at pursuing a more unified voice in foreign affairs—and informal
institutions, which are a set of informal constraints deeply rooted in
cultural norms, standards, and beliefs within society (North 1990, 3647). The EU may be very slowly transcending many centuries of
Westphalian identity in key foreign policy sectors to build toward a
unified voice based on effective institutions. It may simply take time
for the ‘informal’ institutions within the EU, such as norms of interstate
cooperation, to ‘catch up’ with the formal growth in supranational
foreign policy power in the last twenty years.
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7.4

States, Foreign Policy, and the EU as a Global Actor
The possibility that the EU is gradually breaking away from

centuries of Westphalian identity among member-states presents the
question of the state itself, and leads to another implication of this
research. Within the EU, the state continues to be the primary element
of the Council, but the traditional state does not necessarily dominate
the other institutions. Instead, the case of the Parliament
demonstrated how discourse can circumvent the state to shape norms.
Furthermore it is perhaps flawed to assign stateness to the EU, which
may be better understood as anything from a neo-medieval empire
(Zielonka 2006) to a hybrid arrangement. This suggests that it may
not be necessary, or even desirable, to seek a unified foreign policy,
and that multiple levels of foreign policy can exist in a complex
institutional arrangement like the EU.
The EU continues to pursue a unified front in foreign policy, and
many scholars assign at least normative power to the EU in this arena.
This research focused primarily on areas outside the Common Foreign
and Security Policy to identify prospects for the EU as a global actor. It
suggests that the institutions of the EU may not be conducive to
exerting durable normative power or effective as norm exporter.
Scholars who are critical of EU activities that appear to impose norms
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on weaker states can expand their inquiry to ask the extent to which
EU norms are inextricably linked to credible carrot-and-stick policies,
and whether such normative power can exist in places lacking
membership prospects altogether.
Although the EU as a whole and its constituent member-states
can potentially act as unitary actors, this research demonstrated a
dilemma arises when they attempt to do so at the same time. The
competing interests meet at the institutional level, and this is precisely
when gridlock is most likely to occur. The most exemplary instances of
when member-state interests conflict with EU interests are the
controversial topics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in
which the EU as a whole must often defer to the state due to the
intractability of agreement among voting member-states. However, in
non-CFSP cases like those mostly addressed in this research, the
competing interests shift away from a member-state versus EU
dynamic, to a more inter-institutional dynamic, in which the memberstate channels interests through the Council. This means that
competing institutional interests may be more likely to arise in nonCFSP matters, and competing state interests more evident in CFSP
issues.
The dynamics discussed in this research may reflect a new kind
of arrangement with multiple foreign policies, identities, and
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interests—that of different institutions and constituent member-states.
This is most evident in policies outside the limited purview of the
CFSP, such as bilateral, multilateral, humanitarian, and normative
foreign affairs. The tension between pragmatic and normative policies
may seem to undermine the EU, but it may actually be characteristic
of a new supra “state” in the making, one that is not supposed to
embody the cohesive foreign policy of traditional Westphalian nationstates. Whether this is a return to a neo-medieval arrangement, as
some scholars have suggested, or some new conglomerate remains to
be seen. The latter would be especially innovative, as it would be a
pseudo-“state” with a single economy, yet multiple foreign policies,
identities, and interests.

7.5

Additional Avenues for Future Research
This research presents several possibilities for future research in

international relations and comparative politics. This study
demonstrated that foreign policy or discourse thereof is likely based
more on organizational self-interest than the circumstances of the
foreign policy issue at hand. This is similar to Graham Allison’s
argument on bureaucratic politics as a model for institutional foreignpolicy, except that the major role of individual players and
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personalities within the institution was outside the scope of this study.
Future research can explore how competing concerns outside foreign
policy, such as access to resources, may have shaped discourse at the
institutional level (Allison and Halperin 1972; Hyde-Pierce 2004).
Some additional avenues of study include unpacking each
institution to determine patterns of discourse within. Because this
research adopted the institution as the unit of analysis, questions
remain of agents within institutions, such as those proposed by
scholars like Graham Allison, and forums of discourse. Future research
could look for personalities within institutions—such as the president of
the Commission; the largest, most economically robust, and most
political influential states within the Council; and the national origins of
vocal parliamentarians. These actors may reveal further intricacies
that underlie or even compel power in institutions. In addition to
actors within institutions, the forum in which they project discourse
could also be an avenue of research. It may be possible that a
particular institution is more or less likely to invoke democratic
discourse in official speeches rather than bilateral agreements, as one
forum is more legally binding than the other.
Using the constructivist lens, additional studies can explore the
existing discourse further by identifying exogenous shocks to the
discourse, or how agents within the institutions shaped intersubjective
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structures through rhetoric and persuasion (Widmaier and Park 2012).
Democratic norms can be explored to identify how or whether they
conformed to the “life cycle” of norms proposed by Finnemore and
Sikkink (1998), in which norm entrepreneurs draw attention to the
issue (emergence), norms reach a tipping point for diffusion and
socialization (cascade), and the international community widely
embraces the norms (internationalization). Researchers can do this by
selecting normative discourse data, determining which norm
entrepreneurs were active in the rhetoric, and identifying the
longitudinal dimension of attitudes regarding the norms in question.
Other potential future research topics can expand the time
period or case studies to include a longer period of institutional
development or a wider range of political contexts. For example,
research could compare the EU as an actor in the new member states
of Central and Eastern Europe with new case studies to determine
whether the institutional dynamics identified in this research were
present in cases where the EU enjoyed more effective conditionality.
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Appendix A: Acronyms
AP

Action Plans

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Policy

DG

Directorate General

EEAS

External Action Service

EMU

Economic and Monetary Union

ENP

European Neighborhood Policy

EU

European Union

EUMM

EU Monitoring Mission (in Georgia)

TEU

Treaty of the European Union

PCA

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

PCC

Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (of the Parliament)

PSC

Political and Security Committee (of the Council)

SEA

Single European Act of 1986
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Appendix B: Maps

Figure B-1: Map of EU and Neighborhood
Source: European Commission, 2013
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Figure B-2: Map of Caucasus and Central Asia
Source: University of Texas Libraries, 2003
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